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Increased regulation of wireless telephone service is being proposed
by both federal and state policy makers, raising the question of optimal
jurisdiction. The case for decentralization (state rules) is strongest when the
economic activity being regulated is localized and market spillovers are
relatively small. Alternatively, the case for uniformity (federal rules)
becomes more persuasive when externalities dictate that efficiency in one
state is closely tied to efficient arrangements in others. In this situation,
balkanization becomes disruptive and federalism becomes ineffective as
firms conform not to diverse standards, but in the best case scenario, to the
most stringent ones. As an empirical matter, wireless telephony exhibits
strong economies of scale and scope, and national networks have proven
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crucial to industry development. Consolidation of fragmented license areas
was, along with new entry, instrumental in reducing rates by seventy-nine
percent during the 1993-2002 period.'

I. INTRODUCTION
Some states are considering new regulations for wireless telephone
service.2 Alternatively, federal legislation has recently been introduced to
achieve similar objectives. 3 Proposed rules would potentially change
marketing practices, alter the information conveyed in newspaper, radio, or
TV ads, and stretch the "free trial" periods before "early termination fees"
would kick-in (Table 1). The effect on consumers of such measures has
been analyzed in previous research.' This paper discusses the policy
arguments for determining such service rules on a state-by-state basis
versus imposing federal regulatory standards.
Portions of this question have been decided in favor of federal
jurisdiction, while other responsibilities have been given to state law.
Cellular phone service fundamentally depends on spectrum policies
enacted by the federal government. The basic market structure questionshow many firms compete, what technologies they use, how much
bandwidth they access, and how they interconnect with other networksare consequently determined by the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"). Moreover, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
established that "no State or local government shall have any authority to
regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service
or any private mobile service." 5 This effectively preempted state regulation
1. Average rates fell from $0.57 per minute in 1993 to $0.12 per minute in 2002. See
infra Table 3.
2.Jeffrey Silva, States Get Tougher on Wireless, RCR WIRELESs NEWS, Feb. 10, 2003
at 1.
3. See, e.g., S. 1216, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003); see also Press Release, Senator Charles
E. Schumer, Schumer Unveils First Comprehensive Cell Phone User Bill of Rights (Feb. 25,
2003), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press-releases/
PRO1504.html.
4. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Regulating Wireless Phones inCalifornia: An Economic
Analysis, (Apr. 9, 2003),available at http://www.pacificresearch.org/events/2003/wireless/
HazlettPaper.pdf.
5. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000). The
language of this section has been taken by some to include federal preemption of local
zoning authority involving wireless base stations, towers, and antennas. See OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PUB. No. OTA-ITC-622, WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES AND
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of cellular rates with a one-year phase-in, meaning that there has been no
federal or state regulation of wireless telephone charges since August,
1994.
In the 1993 federal preemption statute, however, states were left with
jurisdiction over "other terms and conditions of commercial mobile
services." 6 How much regulatory authority this cedes to the states is legally
uncertain. 7 In equilibrium, it appears clear that there will be some shared
responsibilities, with federal jurisdiction for key economic regulations
including spectrum-related issues, and state authority over matters that are
traditionally decentralized, such as the resolution of contractual disputes in
municipal and state courts.
The question addressed in this paper is where, as a matter of public
policy, to draw the line regarding the consumer protection regulations
currently under consideration. From the perspective of consumer welfare,
and assuming a possible role for regulatory standards, would the standards
be most efficiently evaluated and applied by the several states or at the
federal government level?
Table 1. State and Federal Wireless Phone Regulation Proposals
Gov't
Cal.

Source of Regulation
PUC Rules,
Telecommunications Bill of
Rights 8

THE NATIONAL INFORMATION

Date

Rules

Introduced

Up to fifty-day cancellation
period, identification of service
area/quality, advertising standards
(minimum font, etc.), no
abbreviated contracts
('incorporation by reference")

INFRASTRUCTURE 209 (1995).

June 2002

In addition, federal law

preempted states from levying property taxes on wireless phone licenses, 47 U.S.C. §
332(c)(3)(A).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A).
7. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Leonard J. Kennedy and Heather A.
Purcell, Section 332 of the Communications Act of 1934: A FederalRegulatory Framework
That Is "Hog Tight, Horse High, and Bull Strong," 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 547 (1998).
8. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Telecommunications Bill of Rights, (2003), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/Industry/Telco/030723borwooddraftdec.doc. This is a draft of
revised and, in some cases, scaled-back proposed regulations. The issues are still under
discussion.
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Cal.

PUC Rule R 02-12-0049

Government testing of networks
for quality of service
Thirty-day trial period for new
subscribers
Limits on contract length,
enhanced ability to break contract
Service quality standards,
regulated disclosure of contract
terms, fourteen-day trial period
Number portability (phone
numbers transfer to carrier
selected by subscriber), bundled
with emergency service rules

Cal.

Senate Bill 128'"

Iowa

House File 2322"

Md.

Senate Bill 28812

Wis.

Assembly Bill 889'3

N.Y.

Senate Bill 37504

Disclosure of service area

April 2003

U.S.

Senate Bill 1216:
Cell Phone Users Bill of
5
Rights

Disclosure of contract terms in
uniform format with font size
minimum, disclosure of coverage
areas, FCC monitoring of network
quality, number portability by late

June 2003

U.S.

FCC Docket No. 95-1161

December 2002
February 2003
February 2002
January 2003

March 2002

(dropped at end of session)

2003

Wireless telephone number
portability, after several delays,
scheduled for November 24, 2003

July 1996

9. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's Own
Motion into the Service Quality Standards for All Telecommunications Carriers and
Revisions to General Order 133-B, Rulemaking No. 02-12-004, (Dec. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/word-pdf/rulings/23232.pdf.
10. Cal. S.B. 128, 2003-2004 Gen. Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pubfbill/sen/sb_01010150/sb128bill-20030310_amendedsen.
pdf.
11. H.F. 2322, 79th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2002), available at
http://www.legis.state.ia.us/cgi-bin/Legislation/File-only.pl?FILE=/usr/nshome/docs/GA/
79GA/Legislation/HF/02300/HF02322/020213.html.
12. S.B. 288, 2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. 2003), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/
2003rs/bills/sb/sb0288f.rtf.
13. A.B. 889, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2002), available at
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/200 1/data/AB-889.pdf.
14. S. 3750, 2003-2004 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=S03750&sh=t.
15. S. 1216, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003).
16. Rules and Regulations Implementing The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, paras. 160-172, 29 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 830
(2003).
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Two broad sets of marketplace evidence help to answer this question,
and both suggest that federal jurisdiction is relatively efficient. The first
concerns the efficiency of national scope in wireless networks. The
economics of wireless telephony suggest that regardless of the jurisdiction
selected for rulemaking, diverse local rules will not effectively determine
standards. Rather, nationally integrated network operators will choose to
conform to those regulations that allow them the best opportunity to offer
nationwide service. This undermines incentives for states to create efficent
rules. Either such rules will have little practical impact, or they will create
large external effects, meaning that they impact consumers and suppliers
outside the political jurisdiction where policies are crafted. Such effects are
typically discounted in the decisions of policymakers, resulting in rules that
are relatively inefficient. The second set of data is derived from a natural
experiment involving a 1994 federal preemption of cellular rate regulation
by the states. State controls demonstrably failed to lower rates for
customers. Nonetheless, strenuous arguments were made at the time by
several state regulatory commissions that such controls were efficient and
should be permitted to continue. This speaks directly to the effectiveness of
state regulation of wireless telephone service.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section II sketches a very brief
history of the wireless telephone industry. Section III summarizes the
general arguments for and against federal preemption in economic
regulation. These include examples from other sectors where diverse state
rules are efficient and from where uniform federal standards have proven
efficient. Section IV investigates the economics of wireless telephone
service, producing the key finding that consolidation of an atomistic
licensing grid through mergers and operating agreements has produced
efficient national networks. This is the service that consumers have
demonstrated a keen interest in purchasing. Section V discusses the
importance of national wireless network economies in light of the tradeoffs generally associated with regulatory federalism. Section VI examines
results from a natural experiment wherein state regulation of cellular
telephone rates was preempted in 1994. Section VII concludes that the
weight of the evidence argues in favor of substantial federal preemption in
wireless telephone regulation.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WIRELESS TELEPHONE INDUSTRY
A basic description of the wireless telephone industry will aid in the
discussion of regulatory options. Cellular phone service began with the
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issuance of two competing licenses, mostly by lottery, in each of 306
Metropolitan Service Areas ("MSAs"), between 1984 and 1986, and in 428
Rural Service Areas, between 1988 and 1989.17 This was the result of a
rulemaking process formally initiated by the FCC in 1968.18 The long
delays involved regulatory debate over many issues, including how many
companies should be licensed and how much spectrum should be allocated
for use. The FCC, on an assumption of natural monopoly, initially decided
to license just one operator but became persuaded that some competition
was possible and that licensing two rivals in each service area would still
allow for economies of scale to be realized by each. It allocated various
increments of bandwidth, finally deciding to allot 25 MHz (about the same
used for four television channels) to each license, with the frequencies to be
in the UHF band reallocated from TV channels 70-83.9

17. Thomas W. Hazlett & Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from
Cellular Telephone License Lotteries, 59 S. ECON. J. 425, 427 (1993). Experimental licenses
were issued in Chicago and Washington, D.C., where commercial cellular services
commenced in 1983. Wireless commercial phone service actually dates to 1946, but the
high-power systems had very little capacity. Cellular employs much lower power, yielding
reuse of frequencies from cell to cell, and hence provides the capacity for much more traffic.
L. KETA Ruiz, TOWARD A COMPETITIVE TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY: SELECTED PAPERS

1994 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 14-15 (Gerald W.
Brock ed., 1995).
18. Land Mobile Use of 806-960 MHz Band, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.2d 311 (1968); see also Part 2-Frequency Allocation and Radio
Treaty Matters; General Rules and Regulations, 35 Fed. Reg. 8644 (June 4, 1970); GEORGE
FROM THE

CALHOUN, DIGITAL CELLULAR RADIO 45-49 (1988).

19. An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz, First
Report and Order and Second Notice of Inquiry, 19 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1663 (1970); see
also CALHOUN, supra note 18, at 48.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

Table 2. Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS") Summary20
License
Type
Cellular A

Period
Assigned
1984-89

Cellular B

1984-89

PCS A
PCS B
PCS C

1995

auctions

1995
1996

PCS D
PCS E
PCS F
SMR

1997
1997
1997
1979-2000

Totals

N/A

Assignment
Methods
comparative
hearings,

No.
of
Licenses
734

Bandwidth

Band

25 MHz

800 MHz

734

25 MHz

800 MHz

51
51
493

30 MHz
30 MHz
30 MHz

1.9 GHz

auctions
auctions
auctions
auctions

493
493

10 MHz
10 MHz

1.9 GHz
1.9 GHz

auctions
comparative
hearings,
auctions
N/A

493
48,993

10 MHz
14 MHz
5 MHz

1.9 GHz
800 MHz
900 MHz

52,535

189 MHz

N/A

lotteries

comparative
hearings,
lotteries

1.9 GHz
1.9 GHz

20. See Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Cellular Market Areas: Metropolitan
Statistical Areas and Rural Service Areas, at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/maps/
rsamsa.pdf (showing 734 franchise areas) (last visited Dec. 18, 2003); Wireless Telecomm.
Bureau, FCC, Licensing, at http://wireless.fcc.gov/services/cellular/1icensing/ (explaining
that one "A" and one "B" license were initially authorized in each franchise area, with
overlapping licenses for unbuilt sub-areas assigned by competitive bidding) (last modified
Oct. 23, 2002); Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Auction 4: Broadband PCS A and B
Block, Fact Sheet, at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/04/factsheet.html (last modified Sept.
8, 2003); Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Auction 5: Broadband PCS C Block, Fact
Sheet, at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/05/factsheet.html (last modified Sept. 8, 2003);
Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Auction 11: Broadband PCS D, E, & F, Fact Sheet at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/l1/factsheet.html (last modified Oct. 6, 2003); Wireless
Telecomm Bureau, FCC, Broadcast PCS: Bandplan, at http://wireless.fcc.gov/services/
broadbandpcs/data/bandplan.html (last modified Apr. 11, 2003); Wireless Telecomm.
Bureau, FCC, Cellular Services: Bandplans, at http://wireless.fcc.gov/services/cellular/
data/bandplan.html (last modified June 6, 2002). The SMR License Count, which changes
daily, was obtained November 10, 2003 by searching the Universal Licensing System, at
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/searchAdvanced.jsp
[hereinafter
Universal
Licensing Sytem].
It should be noted that three of the PCS A and B licenses (102 total) were awarded by
pioneer's preference, meaning that auctions were not used. Also, C and F Block PCS
licenses were assigned via auctions as noted, but winners of many of the licenses declared
bankruptcy. The winner of the largest number of licenses, NextWave, was the subject of
bankrupcy litigation until a Supreme Court ruling in early 2003. FCC v. NextWave Personal
Comms., 254 F.3d 130 (D.C. Cir. 2001), affd by 537 U.S. 293 (2003).
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The potential of wireless telephone service was vastly
underestimated. Through the mid-to-late-1980s, prices for actively traded
cellular licenses increased almost monotonically. Beginning trades were
just $12 "per POP" (price of the license divided by total population in the
market area covered by the license), but by 1988, prices exceeded $135.21
By 1990, the aggregate nationwide value of the licenses just in the MSAs
(covering about eighty percent of U.S. population) was estimated at close
to $80 billion by the U.S. Department of Commerce. 2 These large market
capitalizations were driven by reinforcing trends within the sector,
including strong customer demand for wireless phone service, enhanced
network coverage, rapidly falling handset costs, and rapidly increasing
handset functionality (including miniaturization and increased battery life).
Prices were much higher than fixed line service, however, and they
had exhibited no substantial decline since the initiation of cellular
systems. 23 The duopoly market structure imposed on the industry had
established reasonable service, but it was expensive and extremely
fragmented owing to the FCC's 734-market licensing grid. This would
change as competition and consolidation dramatically restructured the
industry.
Entry was primarily achieved in two regulatory proceedings, the most
important being for personal communications services ("PCS"). PCS used
smaller cells than traditional cellular systems, as well as digital formats that
improved capacity and performance.24 Formally initiated in 1990, the
Commission allocated 120 MHz to six new licenses in the 1.9 GHz band.
Two licenses (PCS-A and PCS-B) were allocated 30 MHz each and issued
in each of 51 Major Trading Areas ("MTAs").25 These licenses were
21. Hazlett & Michaels, supra note 17, at 429.
22. NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT POLICY: AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE D-5 (199 1).

23. "There has been a rapid growth of cellular subscribers, due to reduction in
equipment costs, even though service prices have not fallen very much." Ruiz, supra note
17, at 15.
24. DAVID P. REED, PUTING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE COST STRUCTURE OF PERSONAL
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

18-19, 64 (Office of Plans and Policy, FCC, Working Paper

No. 28, 1992), availableat http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp28.pdf.
25. Redevelopment of the Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New
Telecomm. Techs., First Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
F.C.C.R. 6886, 71 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 349 (1992); Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to
Establish New Personal Comm. Servs., Second Report and Order,8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 73 Rad.
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auctioned, pursuant to new federal legislation, in 1995.6 Four remaining
PCS licenses were assigned in each of 493 Basic Trading Areas
("BTAs").27 PCS-C was allocated 30 MHz, the rest (PCS-D, PCS-E, and
PCS-F) were allocated 10 MHz each. Auctions for these licenses were held
in 1996 and 1997.28 With simultaneous auctions, PCS bidders could
aggregate permits to create regional or national service territories, as Sprint
PCS did, for example, in winning licenses covering close to the entire
country.

Reg.2d (P & F) 1477 (1993); Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the
Use of New Telecomm. Techs., 9 F.C.C.R. 1943, 74 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1042 (1994).
26. See Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Auction 4: Broadband PCS A and B Block,
at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/04/ (last modified July 25, 2003); Press Release, FCC,
FCC Grants 99 Licenses for Broadband Personal Communications Services in Major
Trading Areas (June 23, 1995), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/
NewsReleases/1995/nrw15027.txt.
27. See FCC, Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, Auction 22: C, D, E, and F Block
Broadband PCS at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/22/factsheet.html (last modified on Oct.
20, 2003).
28. Bankruptcy disputes arose with respect to many PCS-C licenses, and more than
eighty percent of these licenses (adjusted for population) were as yet undeployed as of July
1, 2003. See Thomas W. Hazlett and Babette E.L. Boliek, Use of Designated Entity
Preferences in Assigning Wireless Licenses, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 639, 649 (1999); see also
Carmen Nobel, Sitting Pretty at Last, EWEEK 26 (June 2, 2003), available at
http://www.eweek.com/print-article/0,3668,a=42693,00.asp.
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Table 3. Growth in U.S. Wireless Telephone Service, 1984-2002
Survey

0

Minutes of

Subscribers

MOU/Subper

Total

Month"

Revenue ($O00s)

340,231

N/A

681,825

N/A

N/A

1,230,855

N/A

N/A

2,069,441

1989

N/A

3,508,944

1990

N/A

1991

11,154,015,983

1992

13,567,533,156

1993

19,160,964,277

1994

26,950,000,239

1995

37,767,122,723

33,785,661

1996

51,970,200,176

44,042,992

Period

Use (MOU)

1985

N/A

1986

N/A

1987
1988

Service

Cost per

Penetration

Minute"

Rate'

482,428

N/A

N/A

823,052

N/A

N/A

1,151,519

NIA

N/A

N/A

1,959,548

N/A

N/A

N/A

3,340,595

N/A

N/A

5,283,055

N/A

4,548,820

N/A

N/A

7,557,148

123

5,708,522

$0.51

2.9%

11,032,753

102

7,822,726

$0.58

4.2%

16,009,461

100

10,892,175

$0.57

6.1%

24,134,421

93

14,229,922

$0.53

9.1%

93

19,080,239

$0.51

12.6%

98

23,634,971

$0.45

16.3%

27,485,633

$0.44

20.2%

2'9

2

1997

62,923,082,455

55,312,293

95

1998

89,010,438,637

69,209,321

107

33,133,175

$0.37

25.1%

1999

147,725,958,780

86,047,003

143

40,018,489

$0.27

30.9%

2000

258,854,860,127

109,478,031

197

52,466,020

$0.20

38.3%

2001

456,964,165,225

128,374,512

297

65,015,885

$0.14

44.4%

2002

619,000,000,000

140,766,842

366

76,508,187

$0.12

47.7%

29. CELLULAR TELECOMM. & INTERNET Ass'N, CTIA's WIRELESS INDUSTRY INDICES
SEMI-ANNUAL DATA SURVEY RESULTS: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT FROM CTIA YEAR-END
2001 RESULTS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. WIRELESS INDUSTRY 192-93, table 107 (Aug.
2002) [hereinafter CTIA SURVEY].
30. Id. at 33, table 11. The 1984 data includes the number of subscribers as of January
1985. The 1985-2002 data was reported in December of each year.
31. The minutes of use per month were calculated using the data from the CTIA
Survey, dividing the total minutes of use per year by the total number of subscribers. That

figure was then divided by 12.
32. CTIA SURVEY, supra note 29, at 70, table 27. The data representing 1984 in this
chart is from the January 1985 data. The 2002 figure is the sum of the June 2002 and
December 2002 data.
33. The cost per minute was calculated using data from the CTIA Survey, dividing total
service revenue by minutes of use.

34. CTIA SURVEY, supra note 29, at 36, table 13. The CTIA calculated the penetration
rates by dividing the total number of subscribers by the population.
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PCS licensees began constructing competing wireless telephone
systems just as Fleet Call, now Nextel, was deploying a nationwide
wireless network using Specialized Mobile Radio ("SMR") licenses. The
plan actually used licenses for local dispatch services (taxis, pizza delivery,
etc.), which by means of a strategic regulatory waiver, were permitted to
provide wireless phone competition.3" By accumulating thousands of
licenses for such localized services and creating a national network with the
right to offer service to the general public, a new coast-to-coast wireless
competitor was created.

35. The entrepreneurial vision driving Nextel was provided by a former FCC attorney,
Morgan O'Brien. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth
Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke":
An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, at 426-428 (2001).
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Table 4. Major U.S. Wireless Carriers (year-end 2002)36
Verizon
Wireless

Cingular
Wireless

AT&T
Wireless

Sprint
PCS

Nextel

T-Mobile
USA Inc.

Subscribers

32.5
million

21.9
million

20.9
million

14.8
million

10.6
million

9.9
million

Net
Additions

3.1
million

360,000

2 million

1.2
million

1.96
million

2.9
million

Technology
Used

CDMA,
AMPS

iDEN

GSM

850,
1900
MHz

TDMA,
GSM,
AMPS
850,
1900
MHz

CDMA

Spectrum
Bands

TDMA,
GSM,
AMPS
850,
1900
MHz

1900
MHz

1900
MHz

Revenue

$19.3
billion

$14.7
billion

$15.6
billion

$12.1
billion

700,
800,
900
MHz
$8.7
billion

$4.9
billion
(est.)

Net Income

$3.6
billion
(Oper.
Income)

$2.5
billion
(Oper.
Income)

-$2.3
billion

-$592
million

$1.7
billion

N/A

Average
Monthly
Churn
Revenue
per User
Cost per
Gross Add
POPs
Covered

2.3%

2.8%

2.6%

3.3%

2.1%

4.3% (Q3)

$48.06
(Q3)

$48.33

$60.20

$61.80

$71.00

$48.46
(Q3)

$375

$350 (Q3)

$377

$353

$450

$308 (Q3)

226.8
million

198
million

213
million

198
million

195
million

192.3
million

(Q3)

(Q3)

(Q3)

(Q3)

36. By the Numbers: U.S. Carriers-FirstTier, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, March 3, 2003,
at 8.
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Ironically, just as entry was deconcentrating the industry, hundreds of
mergers were stitching together regional and national networks. These
reinforced the roaming agreements and joint ventures that had been
launched to create mobile services, giving customers the ability to move
with their telephones and yet receive cellular service through far-ranging
local connections.37
By 2001, when merger activity hit a lull, 38 six national networksAT&T Wireless, Cingular (joint venture of SBC and BellSouth), Nextel,
Sprint PCS, T-Mobile (Deutsche Telekom), and Verizon Wirelessemerged dominant, accounting for about eighty-five percent of U.S.
subscribers. 39 But out of the consolidation arose competition, as no other
country supports more competing networks.4" This rivalry has resulted in a
sharp decline in wireless telephone charges, with the average price per
minute of use declining seventy-nine percent between 1993 and 2002. In
response, total minutes of use have increased more than twenty-fold during
this period. 4 Intense competitive pressure has made profits elusive, a
situation investment analysts describe as "Profitless Prosperity,"42 and
efficiency gains are apparent.

37. Table 4, supra, lists the networks resulting from these combinations.
38. Ironically, major merger activity in wireless ceased just as the FCC "spectrum cap"
was relaxed. The old rule limited operators to licenses allocated no more than 45 MHz in
any one market (with only small overlaps exceeding this amount). This prohibited the
combination of a cellular license with a PCS-A, PCS-B, or PCS-C license in any given
market. The cap was relaxed to 55 MHz in 2001 and abolished in January 2003, although
federal antitrust scrutiny remains. See 2000 Biennial Reg. Review Spectrum Aggregation
Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R.
2763, para. 2, 25 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2031 (2001).
39. See Craig A. Mallitz & Tahmin 0. Clarke, Legg Mason, The Wireless Industry
Scorecard, EQUITY RESEARCH INDUS. ANALYSIS, 4Q 2002, at 70. [hereinafter Wireless
Scorecard,4Q 2002].
40. See infra Table 5.
41. See supra Table 3.
42. Simon Flannery et al., Morgan Stanley, 3Q02 Preview: The Song Remains the
Same, WIRELINE TELECOM SERVS. Oct. 16, 2002, at 27.
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Table 5. Number of Competitive National Wireless Networks43
6
U. S.

5
Japan
South Korea
Netherlands

4
Canada
Denmark
Germany
U.K.

3
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Mexico
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland

2
Czech
Republic
Hungary
Iceland
Luxembourg
New Zealand
Norway
Turkey

III. REGULATION AND THE TRADE-OFFS OF
STATE VS. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. Economic Regulation
Government regulation provides two possible forms of protection for
consumers, both related to the concept of market failure." The first is to
constrain monopoly pricing, countering inefficient distortions from
competitive outcomes. When successful, regulation can lower prices and
increase output. This increases social welfare by producing greater value
for a given complement of labor and capital.
The second general aim of economic regulation is to remedy
externality problems. These develop when costs or benefits do not accrue
43. Sean P. Butson & Craig A. Mallitz, Legg Mason, What's Next for Wireless: A
Roadmap for Wireless Investors, EQUITY RESEARCH INDUS. ANALYSIS Jan. 2001, at 30

[hereinafter What's Next for Wireless].
44. See Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351 (1958)
(explaining the classic analysis of market failure).
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to the decision makers who cause them and are external to economic
calculations. This results in a misallocation of resources, yielding pollution
and various public good problems. This latter situation develops when
efficient economic activities fail to take place because payoffs cannot be
captured by those who would shoulder the costs of provision. Free-rider
problems deny consumers useful products. National defense, pollution
abatement, and creative works of art are valuable services that would
presumably be underproduced without government policies (including
subsidies and intellectual property rights) to offset free-rider effects.
Regulation, of course, is neither free nor perfect. Market failure,
therefore, does not present an automatic case for policy intervention, which
is not a deux ex machina. Market failure is necessary in an argument for
government regulation, but it is insufficient without a convincing case that
regulation will itself produce net consumer benefits.45 Even when market
failure has been addressed by, for instance, rate regulation of monopoly
cable television systems, policy remedies can prove counterproductive.4 6
The case for regulation fundamentally depends on the likelihood of
increased consumer welfare.
Market power is not a compelling rationale for wireless telephone
regulation. Cellular telephone markets were dominated by duopoly
licensees, and market power clearly existed.47 But with the emergence of
PCS and enhanced specialized mobile radio ("ESMR") competition and the
emergence of six strong national networks48 which aggressively rival each
other, government regulators have declared the market to be highly
competitive. In abolishing the "spectrum cap," effective January 2003,
federal regulators certified that market rivalry was effectively protecting
consumers from excessive prices.49

45. Charles Wolf, Jr., A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Frameworkfor Implementation

Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 107 (1979).
46. THOMAS W. HAZLET-r & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE
TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 208-12 (1997).
47. Thomas W. Hazlett, Market Power in the Cellular Telephone Duopoly 1-2 (Aug.
1993) (paper submitted to the FCC on Behalf of Time Warner Telecommunications)(on file
with the Journal).
48. The six networks are: AT&T Wireless, Verizon Wireless, Cingular, Sprint PCS,
Nextel, and T-Mobile. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
49. "Various indicators confirm the presence of meaningful economic competition in
markets for CMRS." 2000 Biennial Reg. Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For
Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 22668, para.30 (2001).
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The case for efficient government regulation in wireless must point to
market failure in the supply of consumer information. Consumers make
choices based on their preferences and product expectations. The data on
which purchasing decisions are based flows from a variety of sources:
experience and research by the consumer, marketing campaigns waged by
sellers, reputational capital of sellers, publicity and product evaluations
provided by news organizations and third parties, and word of mouth.
In some instances, however, reliable information is underprovided
because suppliers are not remunerated for supplying it. Alternative market
mechanisms for discovering which products best satisfy preferences are
available, but they may leave a gap unfilled. The rationale for government
regulation is then to encourage the supply of valuable information that
consumers would gladly pay the market cost of providing.5 0
One particularly important rationale for government regulation arises
under the externality rubric in the context of fly-by-night operations. When
firms supply goods without sinking capital, they may be tempted to cheat
on performance. This behavior may include misleading advertising, hidden
charges, or the delivery of goods or services that are less valuable than
anticipated by the customer.5' In advantageous circumstances for such
supply-side opportunism, cheating vendors may be able to escape with
profits, as consumers have difficulty in identifying such behavior
prepurchase. A legal intervention to improve quality ascertainment,
perhaps through means such as direct regulation or binding rules that force
firms to commit irreversible investment capital, may improve efficiency.
In wireless telephone service, opportunism is relevant to the
regulatory discussion in an interesting way. Wireless network owners
commit very substantial resources to establishing infrastructure; these
assets will only prove profitable where long-run economic viability is
maintained. These sellers are unlikely to fly by night, leaving enormous
capital assets behind.52 This makes the argument for regulatory intervention
50. See W. Kip VISCUSI, ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (3d ed.
2000) (discussing the arguments for economic regulation).
51. Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
ContractualPerformance,89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
52. The possibility that a network service provider could exit the retail market and yet
use its nonsalvageable capital to provide wholesale services to resellers means that
infrastructure investments may not be totally sunk. Yet, the gap in value between a network
that integrates retail services and one that relies exclusively on resellers is likely substantial.
This is implied by the observation that no successful U.S. wireless network executes this
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weaker than in services where market forces do not similarly punish
opportunistic behavior by sellers. Yet, this is where the debate over new
rules for wireless is occurring. This paper, however, is not concerned with
the substantive merits of the arguments for regulation, but with the issue of
optimal jurisdiction.
B. The FederalismDebate
Federalism is a system wherein governmental responsibilities occur at
multiple levels, with power not being entirely centralized or decentralized.
The United States is perceived as a federalist experiment due to its
relatively heavy use of overlapping jurisdictions, from mosquito abatement
districts to the U.S. Government. The European Union has centralized
some important rulemaking authority to regulate economic activity in
sovereign states, making it a federalist experiment of a different character.
Federalism has been described as a balancing act, "the approach to
governance that seeks to combine unity and diversity."53 The compromise
prompts heated debates over where to allocate authority for specific
policies. Two famous positions were staked out by Supreme Court Justices
Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes. Justice Brandeis celebrated
the diversity of state jurisdiction, observing that "[it is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."54
The reverse angle was captured by Justice Holmes, however, who
focused on the importance of rationalizing disparate regulations under
unified national law:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would
business model. Hence, the capital value at stake in preserving a reputation in the market for
retail services is also likely to be substantial.
53. John Kincaid, Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism, PUBLIUS, Spring 1995, at
29, 30.
54. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
This 1932 case concerned an Oklahoma law licensing ice distributors. Brandeis thought it
best to let Oklahoma experiment with a rule that restricted competition, but the majority
overturned it as economic regulation violating the 14th Amendment's equal protection
clause. Cf Michael S. Greve, Laboratories of Democracy: Anatomy of a Metaphor, AEI
FEDERALIST OUTLOOK (2001) (analyzing the trade-offs between constitutionalism and

federalism in the context of Brandeis's dissent in New State Ice Co.), available at
http://www.federalismproject.org/outlook/5-2001 .html.
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be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the
several States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy
prevails with those who are not trained to national views and how
often action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was
meant to end.55
Across the globe such arguments rage. The formation of the European
Union and the restructuring of post-Communist governments have
generated heated debate on the extent of local versus national or
international authority. 6 Decentralization in legal authority is beneficial
because it allows diverse rules to spring up, be tested, and adopted
according to what appears to work best. Uniformity in rules, on the other
hand, offers the efficiencies of standardization.
Economist Barry Weingast writes:
For most of the last 300 years, the richest nation in the world has had a
federal structure: the Netherlands from the late 16th through mid-17th
century, England from the late 17th or early 18th through the mid-19th
century, and the United States from the late 19th century until the late
20th century.57

Weingast argues that the well-developed federal systems found in
these economies helped limit politicization of market transactions, spurring
wealth creation.5 8 Historian Paul Johnson finds that America has far more
political jurisdictions than any other country in the world, and he sees this
governmental diversity as important in understanding both the political and
economic success of the United States.5 9

55. Kennedy & Purcell, supra note 7, at 548 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and
the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 296 (1920)).

56. John Kincaid observes:
The European Union ... reflects emerging governance issues in a world in
which peoples and places have become closely connected by technology, and in
which individuals have been made more mobile by that technology, both
physically and electronically. The need for international governance arrangements
has become more apparent, even while pressures for local self-government by
discrete peoples in distinct places have become more strident. Hence, there is the
seeming paradox of global integration and regional fragmentation occurring
simultaneously.
Kincaid, supra note 53, at 29-30.
57. Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of PoliticalInstitutions:Market-Preserving
Federalismand Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 3 (1995).
58. See id.; see also Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956).

59. See PAUL JOHNSON, A

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

940 (1997).
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On the other hand, eliminating state-level trade barriers via federal
preemption can create a productive "common market," erasing
impediments to efficiency. Constitutional scholar Archibald Cox cites
Gibbons v. Ogden6" as one of the most important Supreme Court decisions
in U.S. history.6 By striking down a New York law monopolizing
steamship routes within the state, the Court protected interstate commerce.
The Court's decision preempted state regulations that would "hamper the
development of one great continentwide, free-trade market," a fundamental
condition for America's economic success.6 2 "Commerce among the
states," Chief Justice John Marshall declared, "cannot stop at the external
boundary line of each State. but may be introduced into the interior."63
Weingast's "market-preserving federalism" carefully includes the caveat
that local jurisdictions need to be constrained by a "common market...
preventing the lower governments from using their regulatory authority to
erect trade barriers. . .. "64

C. State vs. FederalJurisdiction
The question of optimal jurisdiction commonly arises in the United
States when overlapping regulatory interests are present, as in antitrust
law, 65 cable television regulation, 66 food labeling, 67 as well as in wireless
60.
61.
62.
63.

Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 84-89 (1987).

Id. at 85.
Id. at 88 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194).

64. Weingast, supra note 57, at 4 (emphasis omitted). Similarly, in outlining the
theoretical case for federalism, economist James Buchanan notes:
[In] a genuinely competitive federalism... the central or federal government
would be constitutionally restricted in its domain.... Within its assigned sphere,
however, the central government would be strong, sufficiently so to allow it to
enforce economic freedom or openness over the whole of the territory. The
separate states would be prevented, by federal authority, from placing barriers on
the free flow of resources and goods across their borders.
James M. Buchanan, Federalism As an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for
ConstitutionalReform, PUBLIUS, Spring 1995, at 19, 21.

65. See ROBERT H. HAHN & ANNE LAYNE-FARRAR, FEDERALISM IN ANTITRUST (AEIBrookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 02-9, 2002).
66. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable Television Rate Deregulation,3 INT'L J. ECON. Bus.
145 (1996).
67. See Michele M. Bradley, The States' Role in Regulating Food Labeling and
Advertising: The Effect of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 49 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 649 (1994).
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telephony. State regulation is typically better able to regulate when local
markets are relatively idiosyncratic, when the benefits of diverse rules are
large relative to the costs of non-uniformity, when the rules adopted in one
state are largely contained within that jurisdiction, and when state utility
commissions (or local franchising agents) are as technically competent as
federal regulators.68 For example, local utilities have traditionally been
regulated as monopoly franchises by state commissions.
The advantage of differentiation lies in the informational efficiencies
local regulators enjoy relative to the advantages of scale economies they
sacrifice (or disrupt). Diverse state rules allow for trial and error, allowing
different approaches to be tested over time. Yet, conflicting rules and
regulations can clog the wheels of commerce, introducing inefficiencies
that lower consumer welfare.
The economic analysis of federalism is summarized in a 1997 article
in the Journal of Economic Perspectives:
Tiebout (1956) presented the first systematic argument as to how a
decentralized federal structure could be used to achieve economic
efficiency in the provision of public services.... In the Tiebout

economy, most public services are assumed to be congestible and
efficiently provided by small communities. Thus, lower-tier
governments are given significant policy responsibilities. Households
are assumed to be freely mobile; they shop among local jurisdictions
for that community which offers their preferred package of services,
taxes, and regulations.... It is this variety and the pressure it imposes
on the unfavored communities and states which Justice Brandeis most
likely had in mind when advocating local and state governments as
"laboratories" for the design of public policies. However, when there
are significant intercommunity interdependencies (like pure public
goods or spillovers), Tiebout's competition among small governments
may result in economically inefficient public policies.
Potential
69
examples of such inefficiencies include.. . regulation.
68. For a further discussion of whether state or local regulators are more prone to
HAHN & LAYNE-FARRAR, supra note 65.
69. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J. EcON. PERSP.
45, 46 (1997) (citations and footnotes omitted) [Hereinafter Inman & Rubinfeld, Rethinking
Federalism]. In another paper, Inman and Rubinfeld elaborate on economic research related
to public finance:
[T]he current empirical evidence suggests competitive local governments can
provide an efficient level of congestible (local) public goods.... What is not
assured is the efficient allocation of public goods with significant spillovers.... A
policy to control interjurisdictional spillovers would require the agreement of the

capture by competing interests, see
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When economic realities dictate that production of goods is
efficiently done across jurisdictions (i.e., economies of scale stretch beyond
state borders), decentralized regulations lack effective feedback. State
regulators have little direct information regarding costs imposed on
consumers in other states, and they have little reason to acquire this
information. Even assuming that state regulators are well-informed as to
costs and benefits within their political jurisdiction, an important
externality issue is introduced courtesy of economies of scale (including
network effects). As two economists have recently written about state level
antitrust policy, "state officials do not face appropriate incentives to
represent U.S. consumer interests in an antitrust case that could have
national ... ramifications."7 On the same topic, Judge Richard Posner
argues that the effect of state antitrust authorities joining cases with
nationwide implications is to "lengthen out the original lawsuit, complicate
settlement, magnify and protract the uncertainty engendered by the
litigation, and increase litigation costs."'"
Law professor Michael McConnell writes that "[E]xternalities present
the principal countervailing consideration in favor of centralized
government."72 This creates a mismatch between the costs and benefits
considered in decision making by smaller units of government.
Importantly, it occurs not just when property rights are ill-defined (the
Coasian sense of "externality"73 ), but when economies of scale extend
across states. Then the highly complementary nature of supplying
consumers in multiple political jurisdictions produces costs and benefits
which may largely go unnoticed by regulatory authorities.

competitive city-states. For such agreements we must look to more encompassing
political institutions.
Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73, 85-86 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
70. HAHN & LAYNE-FARRAR, supra note 65, at 5. Contra Paul Teske, The Role of State

Institutions in Mediating Interest Group Influence Over Regulatory Policy (Mar. 14, 2003)
(paper submitted for discussion at the Third Annual State Politics Conference), available at
http://www.fsu.edu/-statepol/conferences/2003/PaperslTeske.doc.
71. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940
(2001).
72. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1484, 1495 (1987).
73. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & ECON. Oct. 1960, at
1, 1-40 (attributing inefficiencies associated with external costs or benefits to a lack of
definition, or enforcement, of property rights).
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The key economic issue concerns the costs and benefits of rule
diversity. While consumers may have heterogeneous interests that return
some informational advantage to state jurisdictions, the lack of
coordination with other states can create costs for local consumers that
outweigh these advantages. Costs rise when economies of scale are
important, as is clearly the case with nationally distributed products. The
following analysis discusses preemption issues regarding regulation of
nutritional labeling:
In determining when [federal] preemption might be necessary,
Professor Susan Bartlett Foote noted that "[iun essence, regulations
adopted by individual states are inappropriate when they impose costs
on manufacturers by interfering with economies of scale that would
otherwise be available in the production of nationally distributed
goods." Foote cites state labeling and packaging requirements as
examples of state laws that might in some circumstances sufficiently
impede the flow of interstate commerce to justify federal preemption.74

D. Efficient Federal Preemption
Selection of the optimal jurisdiction largely reduces to a search for the
smallest unit of government (lowest tier) that substantially avoids "beggar
thy neighbor" outcomes from decentralized policy making. These results
occur when non-uniformity is relatively costly and when the advantages of
diverse rules are relatively unimportant. Under such circumstances, several
problems can develop with decentralization, most of which are associated
with free riding.

74. David F. Welsh, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law:
Eliminating the "Gray" Behind the "Green," 81 CAL. L. REV. 991, 1004 (1993)(footnotes
omitted). Welsh provides an interesting overview of the question of regulatory preemption
generally:
There is no clear-cut policy pronouncement concerning when or why Congress
preempts. However, a predominant function of preemption is to invalidate state
laws that frustrate the development of necessary, uniform federal laws.
Additionally, preemption often acts as a means of stopping states from interfering
with the free flow of goods across state lines. In both of these cases, preemption is
used to stop states from fractionalizing the country in pursuit of independent, local
commercial concerns. As the Supreme Court clearly stated, "a central concern of
the Framers ... [was] that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid
the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations...
among the States under the Articles of Confederation."
Id. at 1014 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)) (other footnotes
omitted).
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In public finance, one example involves funding of such public goods
as national defense. Because voters tend to prefer low taxes, elected state or
local officials do too. If taxpayers in jurisdictions contributing little in taxes
cannot be excluded from the defensive services provided by the nation's
armed forces, decentralized provision would be predicted to lead to
underprovision. This means that citizens would get less investment in
national defense than they would be willing to pay, if an effective payment
collection mechanism were in place. In the absence of such, local and state
officials predictably have incentives to limit taxes in their jurisdiction by
free riding on the burdens shouldered elsewhere, a paradigmatic example of
a governmental function most efficiently supplied through the central
authority.
Ronald McKinnon and Thomas Nechyba develop this idea into a
general theory of jurisdiction choice:
Economic theory suggests that the appropriate level of government to
provide a given public good critically depends on the degree of spatial
nonrivalry of that good. Imagine, for example, the (admittedly absurd)
proposition that school districts should provide their own nuclear
deterrents against external threats. This would require substantial
duplication of investment in nuclear arsenals when the same objective
could be met at a significantly lower (per person) cost by the central
government (since the same nuclear arsenal can protect both Los
Angeles and New York). The national nonrivalry embodied in national
public goods thus gives rise to large cost advantages to central
governments whose constituents are numerous because the total
expense of providing the good is independent of the size of the
population.... At the same time, there is no such cost advantage to
having the central government provide such goods as local
neighborhood parks because the nonrivalry of these goods only
extends over a small geographic area.75
McKinnon and Nechyba lay out a grid for analyzing governmental
functions, partially summarized in Table 6. The general argument for
centralization in policymaking is economic efficiency. It is important to
note that the "spatial nonrivalry" aspect of national defense extends to other
domains. While not perfectly "nonrivalrous," network industries that
depend on national economies of scale exhibit similar economic

75. Ronald McKinnon & Thomas Nechyba, Competition in Federal Systems: The Role
of Political and Financial Constraints, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE

TRUSTED? 6-7 (John Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast eds. 1997).
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characteristics.76 Ferejohn and Weingast summarize this point:
Economists conclude that deciding on the best jurisdiction to provide a
particular service depends on the characteristics of that service. If a
given amount of the service can be provided more cheaply when it is
produced for many rather than few citizens (national defense), if the
benefits of the service extend over a large geographic area (certain
types of pollution control), or if decentralization would lead to "bad"
competition among the states or inequitable outcomes across states,
these services should be provided by the national government.77

Table 6. Externalities producing "Centralizing Forces" in the
Selection of Optimal Jurisdiction78
Externalities
Nonrivalry of
national
public goods

Cost advantages
from centralization

Nonexcludability
of public goods

Lower tiers generate
positive
spillovers, provide too
little

Mobilityinduced
externalities

Lower tiers distort
policies to
export weaknesses and
import strengths

Nuclear deterrents
Investments in
specialized expertise
and training
Environmental
protection
Macrostabilization

"Race to the bottom"
Zoning for highsmokestack industries

76. As an empirical matter, federal preemption is often applied to network industries:
All authority to engage in economic regulation of airline, bus, and trucking
companies has been removed from states.... States, however, are authorized to
conduct inspections utilizing national standards relative to grain quality and
weighing, hazardous and solid waste materials, railroad safety, and certain types
of ionizing radiation.
Joseph F. Zimmerman, Preemption in the U.S. Federal System, PuBLIUS, Fall 1993, at
1,6.
77. John. A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, Introduction to THE NEW FEDERALISM:
CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED?, at vii, xii (1997).
78. McKinnon & Nechyba, supra note 75, table 1, p. 14.
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In markets where economies of scale or scope are important, it is
possible for decentralized policy makers to effectively free-ride on
investments undertaken by consumers in other jurisdictions. This occurs
when a system is built to serve a large regional or national market, and state
or local policymakers impose expensive regulations over a subset of that
system. These regulations impose a tax, which may or may not be efficient
for local consumers. Given that costs and/or benefits spill over to other
jurisdictions, effects of local regulatory decisions will likely escape the
attention of policymakers. The pressing issue in considering optimal
jurisdiction is that with decentralized authority there will be important
implications for consumers in other jurisdictions, and that these costs and
benefits are not likely to be accounted for by policymakers. Analogous to a
"race to the bottom," state regulators search for rules that will bestow
benefits locally while shifting costs to network investments that enable
local benefits to be subsidized by users elsewhere.
Suppose a rule is imposed by Idaho regulators mandating that
wireless carriers send each Idaho subscriber a monthly statement
comparing the customer's billing with what identical service would cost on
five other carriers. This "full disclosure" act, let us assume, costs $10 per
subscriber per month. Assume that the benefit to customers, however, is
just $0.50 per month (meaning that each subscriber would agree to pay just
$6.00 per year to receive such a statement). The rule is highly inefficient,
imposing costs twenty times the level of benefits. But state regulators may
still impose the rule, even under the assumption that Idaho regulators are
perfectly loyal to the interests of Idaho residents.
If wireless telephone service is efficiently provided by national
networks (as opposed to local systems), and if providing those networks
entails the use of standardized national calling plans, then customizing a
separate pricing structure for Idaho customers may prove more trouble than
it is worth for wireless carriers. Carriers would then provide the monthly
statements to Idaho subscribers without a differential charge, and
competition would drive these costs to customers in other states. The
charges would be imperceptible to users in Idaho or elsewhere. But the
incentives thereby created would lead to regulatory free riding across all
states, and costs would accumulate.
Three outcomes would result: First, inefficiency would result from
rules that imposed costs in excess of the benefits delivered. Second, the
decline in network profitability (associated with the inefficiency of the
regulations imposed in Idaho) would lower investment in network

Number 1]

CELLULAR PHONE REGULATION

infrastructure nationally. The magnitude could be modest, but the direction
of change is unambiguous: with higher costs, the value of acquiring
subscribers is lower.79 Third, state regulators elsewhere would be tempted
to do what Idaho regulators have done, pursuing ways to impose
nationwide costs that only benefit in-state subscribers. This results in
"beggar thy neighbor" policies which reduce the quality of services for
consumers nationwide.
Even with a best-case scenario, inefficiencies arise when the costs
imposed on wireless users by regulators in one state spill over to
subscribers elsewhere. This would be the case where national network
operators chose to comply with the most restrictive rules, a common result
when diverse rules are imposed and where services offered in one
jurisdiction are highly complementary with services provided elsewhere.
This latter condition obtains with economies of scale in production, or with
networks which become more valuable to customers as coverage area
expands. In food labeling, for instance, states applied diverse regulations
prior to federal harmonization under the Nutritional Labeling and
Education Act of 1990 ("NLEA").8 ° One study notes, "Because food
manufacturers selling to a nationwide market cannot afford to tailor
advertising and labeling for particular states, they usually conform with the
most restrictive applicable law."'"
The problem is not that ripple effects occur, but that state regulators
have no reason to take into account what ripples across state borders. States
can overconsume regulation by dumping costs on others, or they can
underconsume because benefits are too widely distributed. As a general
rule, the lowest level of government that can accurately determine costs
and benefits is the jurisdiction logically selected to make regulatory
decisions: "[E]conomic federalism prefers the most decentralized structure
of government capable of internalizing all economic externalities ... ""
79. The increase in costs is not offset by higher demand, and hence higher prices, for
two reasons. First, national pricing is efficient, and the great majority of customers do not
receive any benefit from the costs imposed in Idaho. Second, Idaho customers are not
willing to pay as much as the regulations cost, such that increased demand would not
entirely offset the higher costs even if optimally configured networks served Idaho alone.
80. Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat.
2353 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
81. Bradley, supra note 67, at 653-54.
82. Inman & Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, supra note 69, at 45 (emphasis
omitted).
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Economic externalities imply that state decision making is ineffective.
That is because firms adjust to diverse regulations by conforming to those
rules that allow for the best aggregate operations. When integrated national
networks are key both to suppliers, who seek scale economies, and to
consumers, who desire nationwide coverage, the competition between the
states results not in diverse standards but "winner take all"-the "winner"
being the state with the most restrictive regulations. In situations where
state regulations contradict each other, even this effort to smooth out
differences in state laws will be stymied, and the costs of balkanization
further increased.
E. Examples of Competition and Preemption
1. Corporation Charters
States compete in the provision of corporate charters. These charters
establish default rules for corporate procedures, governing the relationship
between firm shareholders, bondholders, and managers. The rules laid
down in state charters can be changed according to the preferences of
companies, but the procedures whereby such reforms are enacted take place
under the corporate law in effect. In addition, legal enforcement of
corporate bylaws is provided in state courts under the precedents
established in that state. Hence, the standard charter set forth in law is
likely to have the clearest set of precedents to guide corporate
decisionmakers.
Perhaps the best known aspect of the state charter competition is that
Delaware is the acknowledged leader. "[A]pproximately half of the largest
corporations are incorporated in Delaware, and the overwhelming majority
of firms changing their state of incorporation move to Delaware."83 The
state funds more than twenty percent of its state budget via fees assessed on
each share of stock in firms incorporated there." It has achieved this
success by offering both a standard framework and a legal system (and
voluminous corporate case law), offering incentives for firms to locate their
legal residence in Delaware. This is a virtual geographic choice, of course,
83. Roberta Romano, State Competition for Corporate Charters, in THE NEW
FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 131 (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds.,
1997).
84. Id. at 132. These data go through 1995.
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as incorporation is a legal transaction divorced from where a firm operates
physical facilities.
Scholars have taken both sides of the federalism debate with respect
to corporate charters. But Roberta Romano concludes: "The best available
evidence indicates that, for the most part, the race is for the top and not the
bottom in the production of corporate laws."85 The outcome of a
competition between the states has been "innovative corporate codes that
quickly respond to changing market conditions and firm demands."86 Both
efficient and inefficient laws have been passed, but states have often been
forced to mimic the efficient statutes, and to abandon the inefficient.
Moreover, the lack of choice present in centralized systems does not
provide advantages. "[T]he EU harmonization project for corporate laws
found that European nations have a panoply of restrictive provisions long
eliminated from U.S. codes as unwieldy and unprofitable."87
A key economic aspect of the market for corporate codes is the
extreme mobility of resources. Firm operations have no physical
connection to firm incorporation. This allows markets to react to state laws
without evident externalities.
2. Food Labeling
In the late 1980s, twenty state legislatures considered widely varying
bills regulating nutrition labeling. This prompted federal preemption in the
NLEA.88 Food manufacturers lobbied for the measure, fearing costly
mandates prompted by fifty different standards. 89 The Food and Drug
Administration, the George H. W. Bush Presidential Administration, and
the states originally opposed preemption. Crafting broad rules that garnered
general agreement, however, reduced opposition, and the advantages of
uniformity tipped the scales in favor of national standards.9"
85. Id. at 149.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citation omitted).
88. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535,104 Stat. 2353
(codified as amendment in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
89. See generally David Greenberg & Mary Graham, Improving Communication About
New Food Technologies, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Summer 2000, at 42, 42-48.
90. Bradley, supra note 67, at 658. ("Opposition to preemption was based in large part
on the fear that if states were preempted from enforcing their own labeling laws, consumers
would be left with a weak federal law and lax federal enforcement. The NLEA's structure of
tough standards combined with state enforcement authority quelled these fears and led to
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Economies of national distribution scale again drove the decision.
Consumers are directly and indirectly benefited by having standards
applied consistently across states. Direct benefits flow from reducing
information costs, as consumers familiarize themselves with the same
labels no matter where they might purchase products or where the products
might be manufactured. Indirectly, as manufacturers realize production
efficiencies, lower prices result. This is true in competitive markets and
even in monopolistic markets where incremental costs are reduced. 9 1
The costs associated with state regulation include a reduction in the
rate of market innovation. In dynamic markets where new products, service
packages, or marketing structures are rapidly evolving, this may be a very
high price. Fifty distinct regulatory regimes yield incentives for nationally
integrated suppliers to avoid regional variations in their products by
providing a least common denominator output. Product differentiation may
be costly not only due to sacrificed scale economies, but also because it
incurs state regulatory monitoring costs. Hence, the irony is that
experimentation by state regulators may reduce experimentation by firms.
In food labeling, "[S]ome companies commented that negotiations with
States having unique requirements impeded the development of new
foods."92
Federal preemption for conflicting rules occurred in the NLEA. This
left states with a regulatory role, particularly in enforcement. Both
government and industry have found that the uniformity created by federal
preemption was beneficial. The U.S. Department of Agriculture notes that
consumer awareness of the ingredients in food, the purpose of food
labeling regulations, advanced after the enactment of federal rules:
The Health and Diet Surveys that are conducted every five years are
the most effective means of measuring the effectiveness of educational
interventions in promoting the use of food labels. In FY 90, the Health
and Diet Survey (pre-NLEA) found that 30% of adults used the food
labels to make a decision on the purchase or use of food products. Data
FDA, White House, food industry, and state AGs' general support of the NLEA's
preemption provisions.")
91. Id. at 653-54 ("Inconsistent labeling laws can slow food manufacturing and
distribution, raise prices, and confuse consumers confronted with different information and
warnings. Because food manufacturers selling to a nationwide market cannot afford to tailor
advertising and labeling for particular states, they usually conform with the most restrictive
applicable law.").
92. FOOD & NuTRITION BD., INST. OF MED., FOOD LABELING: TOWARD NATIONAL
UNIFORMITY 155 (Donna V. Porter & Robert 0. Earl eds., 1992).
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from the 1995 survey disclosed that 48% of people age 18 and older
reported changing their decision to buy or use a food product because
they read the food label.93
Food industry sources, while critical of many aspects of federal
regulatory policy, continue to endorse the efficiency of federal preemption.
In fact, a key goal of producers is to extend regulatory uniformity in other
state laws regulating food. An executive with the Grocery Manufacturers'
Association ("GMA") recently testified as follows:
The NLEA advanced toward the important goal of national uniformity
in food regulation. NLEA provided national uniformity for most
aspects of food labeling. It failed, however, to include national
uniformity for food warnings or for food safety. GMA believes that, in
order to have a comprehensive and integrated national system of food
protection, enactment of national uniformity legislation is essential.
Our nation-wide economy cannot support fifty differing state laws
and regulations governing the food supply. Interstate commerce
throughout the wide reaches of our country requires a consistent,
uniform, and predictable system of laws and regulations that permit
transport of food under a single set of regulatory standards. GMA has
actively sought both administrative and statutory adoption of national
uniformity in food labeling for the past several years, and will continue
to seek this objective until it is ultimately achieved.94

3. Trucking
While a court ruling preempted state regulation of interstate trucking
in the 1920s, state regulation was still permitted over intrastate services. 9'
States filled this niche. 96 By the early 1990s, however, eight states had
deregulated intrastate trucking, while "[oither states [had] various

93. FOOD SAFETY RESEARCH INFO. OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FDA FY
PERFORMANCE PLAN, available at http://www.nal.usda.gov/fsrio/ppd/fda05.htm

2001
(last

modified Feb. 15, 2001).
94. Press Release, Grocery Manufacturers of America, FDA Policy Keeps Important
Health
Information
From Public,
at http://www.gmabrands.com/news/docs/
testimony.cfm?DocID=747 (May 3, 2001) (testimony of Lisa Katic, Senior Food & Health
Policy Advisor).
95. See Thomas Gale Moore, Unfinished Business in Motor CarrierDeregulation,
REGULATION,

Summer 1991, at 49, 49.

96. See John C. Taylor, Regulation of Trucking by the States, REGULATION, 1994 No. 2,

at 37, 38.
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restrictions, some quite onerous."9 7 Thomas Gale Moore estimated that
state controls were costing between $5 billion and $12 billion annually.98
State level regulation had long proven a menace to the economic
welfare of shippers. In particular, state rules unfairly benefited railroads.
By lobbying for rules such as weight limits on trucking shipments (often
imposed as safety measures) that differed from state to state, they could
disrupt the emergence of rival networks. Economist George Stigler thought
it provocative that "Texas and Louisiana placed a 7000-pound payload
limit on trucks serving (and hence competing with) two or more railroad
stations, and a 14,000-pound limit on trucks serving only one station
(hence, not competing with it)." 99

But the primary liability of state regulation was the inherent
inconsistency of disparate rules dotting regional or national truck routes. In
a recent brief to the Supreme Court, the American Trucking Association
explained that, "Inevitably, the resulting patchwork of state regulations...
interfered with the standardization of vehicles and wreaked havoc on the
burgeoning motor carrier industry. '' l°" The brief goes on to cite the analysis
of Ohio State University history professor William R. Childs:
If a trucker began a trip in Chicago, heading east, he could load a truck
and trailer with a total of 39,000 pounds, 20,000 on the truck and
19,000 in the trailer. When he approached the Indiana border, he had to
remove 16,000 pounds from the truck and 12,800 pounds from the
trailer to meet the Hoosier State's limit of 10,200 pounds. Once in
Ohio he could add a total of 7,000 pounds; Pennsylvania allowed an
additional 14,000 pounds (to total 31,200)....

In addition to the weight restrictions, states imposed different limits
on the height, length, and width of commercial vehicles....
Local, state, and interstate truckers suffered from increased operating
costs, while [truck] manufacturers faced diverse production
requirements .... t0'

97. Moore, supra note 95, at 55.
98. See id. at 57.
99. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3,8(1971).
100. Brief of Amici Curiae American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. at 7, City of Columbus v.
Ours Garage and Wrecker Serv., 536 U.S. 424 (2002) (No. 01-419).
101.

WILLIAM R. CHILDS, TRUCKING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EMERGENCE OF

FEDERAL REGULATION 1914-1940, 52-54 (1985), quoted in American Trucking Association
Brief at 7, (No. 01-419).
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The history of trucking regulation involves a long march to federal
preemption. For decades, federal courts overruled state trucking
regulations, on the grounds that "it is well settled that a state has no power
to fetter the right to carry on interstate commerce within its borders by the
imposition of conditions or regulations which are unnecessary and pass
beyond the bounds of what is reasonable."' 2 State commissions, however,
continued to impose rules by interpreting federal decisions narrowly,
setting up a running controversy over appropriate regulatory jurisdiction.
Some of this was resolved by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,1"3 which
shifted intrastate rate-setting authority to the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Yet, states continued to attempt to impose their own rules,
and not all were immediately struck down by federal courts."° "[T]his
' 10 5
continuing parochialism ... wreaked [havoc] on interstate commerce,"
and fueled demand for harmonization even after federal trucking
deregulation was enacted in 1980."°6
Further federal preemption was achieved in 1994 as part of a bill to
generally deregulate transportation carriers, and was specifically aimed at
improving intermodal competition.0 7 Effective January 1, 1995, economic
regulation of intrastate trucking was preempted by federal law. This left
states able to regulate very limited aspects of trucking, including safety.
But when, for example, municipalities attempted to license tow truck
operators, their regulatory efforts were struck down by the Supreme Court
in 2002.'0 s The federal preemption is conservatively estimated to result in
efficiency gains of $4 billion annually." °
The rationale for federal preemption in trucking has direct application
to the wireless telephone preemption question. Trucking is a network
102. Mich. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577 (1925).
103. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (renamed part II of the
Interstate Commerce Act) (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C.§ § 301-302).
104. For examples of state laws struck down by federal courts, see Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc., v. Rice, 434 U.S.
429 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
105. Amicus Curiae Brief at 13, City of Columbus, 536 U.S. 424 (No. 01-419).
106. Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
107. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2000), preempted states from regulating the rates or services of motor carriers.
108. City of Columbus, 536 U.S. 424.
109. PAUL TESKE ET AL., DEREGULATING FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION: DELIVERING THE
GOODS 74 (1995) [hereinafter TESKE ET AL.].

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

industry, and rules imposed by individual states may have national
consequences:
According to the Conference Committee report, Section 601 of the
FAA Authorization Act was intended to preempt a "patchwork" of
intrastate motor carrier regulations in 41 states that placed intolerable
burdens on interstate commerce by causing "significant inefficiencies,
increased costs, reduction of competition, inhibition of innovation and
technology and curtailing the expansion of markets." 1 0
Many trucking interests supported harmonization of rules which
would be achieved via federal preemption:
Consider, for example, the situation of a nationwide motor carrier that
conducts operations in communities throughout the country. Even if
state and local regulations never came into direct conflict with one
another... for such a carrier to keep current on all of the individual
municipal ordinances applicable to its trucking operations would be a
Herculean task.''
Political momentum for federal preemption was advanced by separate
campaigns waged by competitors in the overnight delivery business,
Federal Express and UPS. Federal Express, with a fleet of over 450
airplanes and more than 30,000 trucks, became concerned when states such
as California began regulating important aspects of its business in the
1980s:
The firm was extremely frustrated with California trucking regulations,
including ones that prohibited it from offering such advantageous
services to its customers as longer credit, providing telephone rather
than written claims, and a money-back guarantee.... Founder Fred
Smith argued: "There has been no such thing as purely intrastate
commerce since maybe when Daniel Boone was in Tennessee.""' 2
Federal Express, defined as an air carrier, was able to win a federal
legal challenge to California state regulation, 1 3 after which many other
states chose to deregulate. UPS, defined as a surface carrier, now saw itself
at a competitive disadvantage and lobbied hard for federal preemption of
state regulation. Trucking firms generally joined the mutual effort of the
110. Brief of Amici Curiae American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. at 19, City of Columbus, 536
U.S. 424 (No. 01-419).

111. Id. at 22.
112. TESKE ET AL., supra note 109, at 139 (footnote omitted).
113. Fed. Express Corp. v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n., 716 F. Supp 1299 (N.D. Cal.
1989), rev'd and remanded by 936 F.2d 1075 (9" Cir. 1991) (holding that regulation of
Federal Express Corp.'s trucking operations, which were an integral part of the company's
operations as an air carrier, was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act).
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overnight delivery firms to secure this reform, as they "began to see the
competitive disadvantages that they might face as a consequence of a
mismatch between

regulatory

regimes.

""'

Some of the disruptive,

balkanized rules that transport suppliers faced are directly analogous to
those proposed by state regulators in wireless.
4. Broadband
In emerging broadband markets, two principal competitors have
emerged for residential customers: cable modems and digital subscriber
lines ("DSL"). Both services are governed by rules set at the federal level,
preempting local and state regulation. The issue of jurisdiction has perhaps
arisen most pointedly in the conflict over "open access" rules for cable TV
systems offering high-speed Internet access. Local franchising authorities
have, in some instances, sought to impose requirements that cable operators
make their systems available to independent Internet Service Providers
("ISPs"), who could then offer retail services to users via cable system
connections. This local policy has been both preempted and rejected by the
FCC in a series of rulings. The rationale for preemption has been
consistent: clear national rules will spur investment and thus make new
services available to consumers.
For instance, the FCC acted in 1999 to block local regulations
imposed by such cities as Portland, Oregon, despite the fact that a federal
district court upheld the city's action, which was "celebrated... as
protection of local authority against federal preemption... 5 William
Kennard, chair of the Commission at that time, declared his motivation:
"My No. 1 concern, numero uno, is we've got to get Americans faster
Internet access in their homes."' ' 6 While cable systems were franchised by
municipal governments, localized broadband rules would undermine
development of new broadband technologies everywhere. This led Kennard
to propose federal preemption:
"It is in the national market interest that we have a national broadband
policy," Kennard told the audience. That policy is to let the industry
114. TESKEETAL., supra note 109, at 141.
115. Paul Teske & Andrey Kuljiev, Federalism, Preemption, and Implementation of the
1996 Telecommunications Act, 30 PUBLIUS, Winter/Spring 2000, at 53, 60 [hereinafter
Teske & Kuljiev].
116. Peter Elstrom et al., Whose Cables Are They?, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (July 5,
1999)
at
http://www.businessweek.com/@ @E5SKe4QQWqxFtRIA/1999/99_27/
b3636053.htm.
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grow as the market dictates, he said, but the decision in Portland would
have a decidedly opposite effect. "The fact is there is a role for
national policy.., we have to have a national standard in this area,"
Kennard said.... Taking a lead from the medical field, Kennard
'l 7
coined the policy as the "Hippocratic high-tech oath-do no harm."
The Commission then filed an amicus brief in AT&T/TCI v. City of
Portland, a 1999 case in which local "open access" obligations were
challenged by the cable franchisee." 8 The FCC argued for federal
preemption of such regulatory disputes." 9 In a report to the Commission by
the Cable Services Bureau in October 1999, the FCC expanded its findings
on the basis of evidentiary hearings, concluding that "[r]apid nationwide
broadband deployment depends on a national [broadband] policy." 2 ' This
was explained as follows:
There seemed to be wide agreement among our panelists that
consumers would be poorly served by a fractured broadband landscape
wherein each locality devises its own set of cable Internet access
regulations. All of the financial analysts expressed concern over the
prospect of hundreds of LFAs [local franchising authorities] regulating
broadband access.... The concern is that cable companies would
move away from or substantially slow cable modem deployment and
focus on telephony, thereby thwarting the public policy objective
of
21
rapid deployment of advanced technologies to all Americans.
In its decision, issued in June 2000,2 the Ninth Circuit found that
cable modem service was a service under the statutory jurisdiction of the
FCC. The issue was resolved by a Commission ruling in March 2002. The

FCC reiterated its earlier policy: "In a DeclaratoryRuling adopted today,
the FCC concluded that cable modem service is properly classified as an
interstate information service and is therefore subject to FCC
117. Jim Davis & Corey Grice, FCC's Kennard Slams Open Access Ruling, CNET
NEWS.COM (June 15, 1999), at http://news.com.com/2100-1033-227121.html.

118. Brief of Amici Curiae FCC, AT&T v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (No.
99-35609), available at http://www.techlawjournal.com/courts/portland/19990816fcc.htm.
119. Teske & Kuljiev, supra note 115, at 61 ("The FCC maintains that to guarantee fast
nationwide deployment of broadband services, a single national policy is required (and, in
this case one of 'hands-off-the-Net'), and that regulation at any level may affect adversely
the speed at which firms introduce the new technologies.").
120. Deborah A. Lathen, A Staff Report to William E. Kennard, Chairman Federal
Communications Commission on Industry Monitoring Sessions Convened by Cable Services
Bureau, BROADBAND TODAY, Oct. 1999, at 39, available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf.
121. Id.
122. City of Portland,216 F.3d 871.
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jurisdiction."'' 3 The FCC went on to rule that it would be in the public
interest to continue to preempt local or state regulatory authority in favor of
a national deregulatory policy that would encourage broadband
development:
In the interest of national uniformity, the FCC should exercise its
forbearance authority in light of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit's decision in the Portland case, which classified cable
modem service
as both124 an "information
service" and
"telecommunications service."'
The same issue of federal preemption dominated the 2002 FCC ruling
on whether to classify cable modems as "cable services," "information
services," or "telecommunications services." If cable modems were to be
defined as "cable services," this would expose operators to regulations and
taxes imposed by states and/or local franchising authorities; if deemed
"telecommunications services," operators would potentially face federal
regulation; if designated "information services,"
federal deregulation
125
would preempt state or local rules.
The FCC chose the latter
classification, preempting localities and simultaneously deregulating cable
modem service. It did this explicitly to create regulatory uniformity
designed to encourage the creation of nationwide data networks:
In this part of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we address
potential areas of regulatory uncertainty at the State and local levels
that could also discourage such investment and innovation. We would
be concerned if a patchwork of State and local regulations beyond
matters of purely local concern resulted in inconsistent requirements
affecting cable modem service, the technical design of the cable
modem service facilities, or business arrangements that discouraged
cable modem service deployment across political boundaries. We also
would be concerned if State and local regulations limited the
Commission's ability to achieve its national broadband policy goals to
"promote the deployment of advanced telecommunications capability
to all Americans in a reasonable and timely manner," "to promote the
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer
services and other interactive media" and "to preserve the vibrant and

123. Press Release, FCC, FCC Classifies Cable Modem Service as "Information
Service" (Mar. 14, 2002) available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/NewsReleases/

2002/nrcbO2Ol.html.
124. Id.
125. See Barbara S. Espin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes and Cable Open Access:
Where the Global Information Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of-Way, 10 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS (2001) 23, at 25-28.
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competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal
or State regulation."' 26
F. Summary: CharacteristicElements Associated with Preemption
National preemption of state regulation has occurred in many markets
where national economies of scale and scope are crucial to efficiency. This
often comes about in response to problems with a lack of uniformity in
markets where costs are particularly high, or when a patchwork regulation
reduces product experimentation, restricts investment, and raises costs. As
demonstrated below, wireless telephony would appear to share many of the
characteristics seen in markets with federal preemption. These factors are
summarized here in Table 7.
Table 7. Key Factors in Evaluating Regulatory Decentralization
Factor

Argument for Decentralization

Characteristicsof Wireless
Phone Market

Degree of diversity

Idiosyncratic markets yield state

National networks key to

in local markets

regulators better information

competitive rivalry

Regulatory

Diversity is an advantage (trial

Uniformity of rules assists

coordination

and error, competitive selection)

formation of national networks;

when low value to harmonization

Federal spectrum allocation
policies essential to market
performance

Spillover effects

Costs and benefits of local rules

National networks make state

internalized

markets highly complementary,
costs of non-uniform rules
spillover

State level

Economies of scale (and

State regulatory policies

regulatory

specialization) not associated

ineffective; Federal preemption

competence

with improved regulation

of rate regulation successful

126. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, para.
97 (2002).
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IV. THE EFFICIENCY OF NATIONAL WIRELESS NETWORKS
A. Consolidation and Lower Prices
Perhaps the best-documented observation about wireless telephone
markets is that national networks are efficient. Annual studies of the CMRS
market by the FCC make this point repeatedly: fragmentation of wireless
phone service is extremely costly, and the emergence of broad-based
systems drives costs down for both operators and consumers.
The U.S. market has gravitated to national networks because of
economic efficiency, not due to regulatory constraints or path dependency.
Indeed, regulators allotted thousands of local licenses, resisting any bias to
impose national scope on service providers. Economic rationalization via
mergers, joint ventures, and marketing agreements has driven aggregation
of disparate franchise areas into nationwide systems. In contrast to the
United States' selection of 734 cellular franchise areas, 51 PCS-A and
PCS-B franchise areas, and 493 PCS-C, -D, -E, and -F franchise areas, no
other Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
("OECD") country had more than the eleven franchise areas used by
Canada. The great majority of countries are issued national licenses for
mobile wireless on the presumption that wide area networks are efficient.
Table 8. FCC License Aggregation in Wireless Telephony
(2003)127

AT&T
Cingular
Nextel
Sprint PCS
T-Mobile
Verizon
Nextwave
Others
TOTAL

Number of Licenses
Cellular
PCS
56
282
132
89
0
0
0
163
0
269
165
117
0
95
1,434
1,660
1,787
2,675

SMR
0
104
41,833
0
13
0
0
5,185
47,104

TOTAL
338
325
41,833
163
282
282
95
8,279
51,597

127. See Universal Licensing System, supra note 20. Information was collected on July
31, 2003, by running searches in each license category.
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From a radically fragmented starting point, national networks now
dominate the marketplace. By the year 2000, six national networks had
emerged after nearly two decades of semicontinuous merger activity. These
six network operators provide the overwhelming majority of service for the
overwhelming majority of subscribers, accounting for 85.4% of service
revenues in the fourth quarter of 2002.128 The networks are pieced together
from 3,642 separate licenses issued by regulators, and this omits the 47,104
Specialized Mobile Radio licenses which Nextel (formerly Fleet Call)
1 29
pieced together to construct a national wireless network.
Regulators did not believe that this consolidation would, or should,
occur. In 1995, in fact, the FCC theorized that national wireless service
could be efficiently provided by local suppliers. Coordination between
independent carriers could be arranged through roaming agreements and
other contractual devices:
Broader geographic markets have been asserted on several grounds.
First, some carriers are offering "regional" service options, which give
customers flat-rate calling areas as large as a whole state. At the
present time, however, such plans (and customers using them) are the
exception, not the rule. Second, most mobile radio services are
provided by large regional or national corporations, and there is case
law holding that the relevant geographic market is nationwide when a
service, even a local one, is provided uniformly across the nation by
centrally managed companies. Third, the industry and some analysts
speak increasingly of customers demanding "seamless service."
However, this may show simply that some customers want a
recognized national brand name on a product that remains essentially
local. In sum, while there is evidence that regional and national
markets may be emerging, it appears that the vast majority of mobile
radio services are provided in local and metropolitan geographic
markets under current conditions.130

128. See Wireless Scorecard,4Q 2002, supra note 39, at 71.

129. Nextel has produced a national wireless network by acquiring 41,833 (88.8%) of
SMR licenses. See Universal Licensing System, supra note 20.
130. Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, First Report, 10 F.C.C.R. 8844, para 64, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1322 (1995)
[hereinafter FirstAnnual CMRS Report].
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But investors saw this differently. Between 1992 and 2002,
substantial consolidation of the wireless telephone sector took place, even
as new PCS and SMR entrants were introduced. As seen in Table 9, the
largest U.S. network in 1992 covered just a quarter of potential subscribers;
a decade later, each of the top six networks covered nearly 75% or more.

131. CELLULAR TELECOMM. & INTERNET ASS'N, Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey,
(2003), at http://www.wow-com.com/industry/stats/surveys; Implementation of Section
6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Third Report, FCC 98-91, app.
B, table 4, 12 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 623 (June 11, 1998), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Reports/fcc98091.pdf
[hereinafter CMRS Third
Annual Report]; Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Fourth Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 10145, app. B, table 15, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
289 (1999) [hereinafter CMRS Fourth Annual Report]; Implementation of Section 6002(b)
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Fifth Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 17660, app.
B, table 3, 21 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1320 (2000) [hereinafter CMRS Fifth Annual Report];
Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Sixth Report, 16 F.C.C.R. 13350, app. C, table 3, 34 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 170 (2001)
[hereinafter CMRS Sixth Annual Report]; Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Seventh Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 12985, app. C,
table 4, (2002) [hereinafter CMRS Seventh Annual Report].

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

Table 9. Coverage and National Scope of Largest
132
Wireless Carriers
Carrier
1992
McCaw
GTE
BellSouth
Southwestern Bell
PacTel
NYNEX
2002
Verizon Wireless
T-Mobile
Cingular Wireless
AT&T Wireless
Nextel
Sprint PCS

POPs
(million)

Percent of U.S.
Population

65.0
53.6
44.6
36.2
36.5
26.0

25.5
21.0
17.5
14.2
14.3
10.2

248.0
242.2
231.0
259.0
230.0
211.0

85.1
83.1
79.3
88.9
79.0
72.5

This marketplace evidence was changed by the FCC's opinion
regarding the scale efficiencies. The emergence of nationally integrated
networks and calling plans demonstrated that consumers were demanding
services most economically provided on a broader scale. As larger
networks formed, prices plummeted and demand skyrocketed. Between
1995 and 2002, the average price per minute fell from $0.51 to $0.12;
minutes of wireless use rose sixteen-fold.'3 3 Industry consolidation was
marked during this period. As Figure 2 illustrates, the top six wireless
operators served about 55% of U.S. subscribers in the mid-1990s and
132. See CELLULAR TELEPHONE INDUSTRY ASS'N, THE STATE OF THE CELLULAR
(1993); Wireless Scorecard,4Q 2002, supra note 39, at 82; Population Estimates
Program, U.S. Census Bureau, Monthly Estimates of the United States Population: April 1,
1980 to July 1, 1999, (Jan. 2, 2001), available at http://eire.census.gov/popest/archives/
national/nationl/intfilel-l.txt; Population Div., U.S. Census Bureau, National Population
Estimates: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2002, (Dec. 31, 2002), availableat http://eire.census.gov/
popest/data/national/tables/NA-EST2002-O1 .php.
133. See supra Table 3.
INDUSTRY,

Number 1]

CELLULAR PHONEREGULATION

nearly 80% in 2000. Concentration did not rise in local markets (where, in
any event, the FCC's "spectrum cap" constrained mergers). Instead,
fragmented wireless operators were forming national networks."3
Figure 2: Wireless Subscriber Concentration and Average Revenue per Minute
$0.70
$0.60
$0.50$/Min.
$0.40
$0.30
$0.20
$0.10
$0.00
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993 1994 1995 1996
1997
1998 1999 2000
2001
Source:CTIA Wireless Industry SurveyandCMRSReports.
1989-1993 Top 6 Subscriber
data from Kidder Peabody
& Co.,Wireless World: The Mobile TelephoneIndustry (Spring 1994),p. 16.

The sharp drop in wireless telephone rates in the mid-1990s appears
to be a deviation from the preexisting trend. State regulatory authorities
told the FCC in 1994 that cellular rates had been fairly stable since the
initiation of service in the mid-1980s.' 35 Also in 1994, economist William
134. See CTIA SURVEY, supra note 29; Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Second Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 11266, table 2, 7
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1997) [hereinafter CMRS Second Annual Report]; CMRS Third
Annual Report, supra note 131; CMRS Fourth Annual Report, supra note 131; CMRS Fifth
Annual Report, supra note 131; CMRS Sixth Annual Report, supra note 131; CMRS Seventh
Annual Report, supra note 131; Steven R. Yanis, Kidder, Peabody & Co., The Mobile
Telephone Industry, Wireless World 16, table 8 (Apr. 7, 1994).
135. The CPUC FCC Filing (1994) notes that the Commission allowed duopoly cellular
carriers "to set retail rates for any service plan based on what the market would bear and not
on cost." Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Petition of
the People of the State of California and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of
California to Retain State Regulatory Authority over Intrastate Cellular Service Rates, PR
94-108, at 12 (Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter CaliforniaCPUC Filing]. To enhance competitive
pressures, however, the CPUC mandated wholesale access to networks at rates which were
projected to be profitable for resellers. After setting up a system in 1990 to monitor the
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Shew observed that the "average price of cellular service, in nominal terms,
has exhibited a mild downward trend."'' 36 Rates plummeted only after PCS
entry and the consolidation of national networks. In Figure 1, national
wireless industry concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index) 37 and wireless phone rates (calculated as the average price per
minute of use) are shown for the 1997-2001 period.' 38 During these five
years the correlation between the HHI and market prices is -0.88. As
consolidation increases, prices decline.
The importance of national scope in service provision is clear. Seven
years after the FCC hypothesized that local wireless operations might be
competitive with national networks, market evidence clearly indicated the
reverse: subscribers wanted the lower prices and ease of use, including
roaming, made possible by consolidation and uniform national services.
Key to this conclusion was the popularity of AT&T's "Digital One Rate"
plan, a service offering that obliterates regional differences. When first
brought to market in May 1998, AT&T's move was considered a risky
gamble, but competitors rushed to offer similar plans of their own. The
success of AT&T's uniform nationwide offer with customers was neither
lost on market rivals nor on the FCC:
The Commission has concluded previously that operators with larger
footprints can achieve certain economies of scale and increased
efficiencies compared to operators with smaller footprints. Such
results of the regulatory plan, the Commission determined in 1993 that "Three years later
virtually none of the Commission's expectations [of reducing cellular rates] have been met
by industry performance." Id. at 17 (citation omitted). New rate controls were then crafted,
but the following year the CPUC found that "none of the new or existing plans experienced
any permanently lowered wholesale or retail rates" under them. Id. at 18.
136. William B. Shew, Regulation, Competition, and Prices in the U.S. Cellular
Telephone Industry, ENSAE-CREST Conference on the Economics of Radio-Based
Communications 4 (June 23-24, 1994) (on file with the Journal).
137. The HerfindahI-Hirchman Index (HHI) is the sum of the firm market shares
squared

ms

where "n" is number of firms in the market and "is"

is the

marketshare of individual firms. This calculation differs from the standard analysis of
industrial concentration. This metric shows total industry aggregation, not the number of
competitive service providers faced by individual customers, which is the margin of concern
in the typical competition policy (or antitrust) inquiry. Here we aim to see just the reverse,
the relationship between consolidation of geographically dispersed networks and price
declines due to intensifying competitive pressures.
138. This table is inclusive; information was chosen because market share data was
available.
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benefits, along with advances such as digital technology, have
permitted companies to introduce and expand innovative pricing plans
such as digital-one-rate ("DOR") type plans, reducing prices to
consumers.

Since the end of 1999, carriers have been building nationwide
footprints through various forms of transactions. One of the driving
forces behind many of these transactions has been the desire of large
regional carriers to enhance their ability to compete with existing
nationwide operators that offer attractive nationwide pricing plans.
operators have sought to fill in gaps in their
More recently, national
39
coverage areas.'
This regulatory finding is only one of many indicating the importance
of unified national networks. 4 ' These developments are fundamental in
evaluating the optimal regulatory jurisdiction in wireless telephony.
Because "seamless" operations are crucial to the competitiveness of
wireless operators, these firms naturally sLrive to homogenize their
offerings and to exploit economies of scale in advertising and marketing. In
this marketplace, non-uniform offerings are inefficient, and wireless
carriers will naturally gravitate to standard packages in order to deliver the
efficiencies demanded by their customers.
To comply with diverse state rules, firms have three options. They
can choose to sacrifice economies of scale, producing custom services state
by state. Alternatively, they can choose to provide a national plan, tailoring
it to comply with the most stringent state requirements. This may be
impossible if state rules actually conflict; balkanized service plans would
be required. This raises compliance costs and, ironically, eliminates the
effectiveness of most states' regulations. That is because the most stringent
rules will be set by regulators in another state, except in the special case
when most people live in states where regulators reach precisely the same
set of "toughest" rules. (Of course, if this special case is obtained, federal
preemption would then be appropriate on the grounds of administrative
efficiency.)
Finally, firms can adopt a hybrid approach where they maintain a
national standard for most markets but customize local service where state
regulation is onerous. This sacrifices some, if not all, scale economies
139. CMRS Seventh Annual Report, supra note 131, at 12997-98.

140. Appendix 1 is a representative sample of such comments in the FCC's Annual
CMRS Reports, 1995-2002. Appendix 2 lists similar observations made by investment
analysts, buttressing such findings.
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while providing a safety valve to mitigate very expensive regulations that
may be assessed in some jurisdictions. Some rules can prompt suppliers to
tailor state level offerings by simply exiting some markets altogether.'
While that is unlikely in wireless telephony due to demands for ubiquitous
coverage, firms can partially exit high-cost markets, investing less in cell
sites, base stations, marketing, and other inputs. Table 10 provides a
summary of these responses.

Table 10. Regulatory Compliance Strategies by Firms
with Diverse State Rules
Compliance
Strategy

Economic Implications

Customize service
state by state
Tailor national
service standard to
tightest state
regulations
Select which states
to offer a national
plan and which to
offer custom (or no)
service

Minimizes cost of compliance in each state, but
eliminates important economies of scale
Raises costs of regulatory compliance and
eliminates effective state regulatory function;
state with the tightest rules "free rides" by
imposing its standards on other states
Eliminates some, but not all, economies of scale

141. With patchwork state rules governing environmental claims, firms have often
chosen not to provide useful "green" products:
As the costs associated with green marketing rise, honest manufacturers may
simply cease providing environmental information. One manufacturer testified
before the FTC that "[t]he Balkanization of environmental regulation effectively
bars national manufacturers from making truthful, beneficial claims about the
environmental attributes of their products and packaging. These laws deny
consumers
truthful,
educational
and
valuable
environmental
information."According to a trade association representative, "[i]f, as seems
likely, conflicting local and state regulations silence national marketers with
respect to environmental claims, the ability of consumers to make
[environmentally beneficial] choices.., will be seriously impeded."
Welsh, supra note 74, at 81 (footnotes omitted).
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Observed characteristics of the mobile telephone services market
suggest that economies of scale and scope are important to consumers and
that the licensing scheme instituted by the FCC imposed costs on the
market by issuing licenses that unnecessarily fragmented networks. Moving
to issue PCS licenses, the FCC specifically noted that cellular markets had
been atomized with licenses issued by lotteries in 734 franchise areas. 142 It
sought to promote aggregation both by licensing larger service territories in
PCS and by awarding licenses via simultaneous auctions in which bidders
could easily aggregate wireless service areas.
As entry has occurred, industry consolidation has also intensified,
with the result being that prices have plummeted. Consumers have
demonstrated their approval by purchasing more minutes of use, and
wireless carriers have competed to offer rival "buckets" of nationwide
minutes with uniform pricing. These developments have not been driven by
regulators or imposed by firms, but have been the outcome of a competitive
discovery process in which underlying efficiencies have proven themselves
via the market test.
Under such conditions, the implications for federal regulatory
presumption are straightforward. To cede jurisdiction to state commissions
risks undoing national network offerings that have taken years to construct
and that deliver demonstrable benefit to users. Firms could relocalize
service offerings, with the industry returning to its roots as a costly
patchwork of small-area networks. Roaming was initially difficult and
expensive, national marketing campaigns impractical, and competitive
forces weak. Both users and carriers have benefited from the economies of
scale and scope that came with national pricing of national networks, a
development that is very far along and closely observed by FCC regulators.
To force firms to readjust to locally diverse regulatory constraints would be
to undo the proconsumer investments made over the past two decades, thus
creating efficient national networks and "Digital One Rate" plans,
undermining competitive forces and threatening consumer interests.

142. "[T]he transaction costs associated with license resales after [cellular license]
lotteries have been quite significant. For example, for the year 1991, these costs have been
estimated at $190 million." FCC Rpt. to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, Report, WT Dkt.
No. 97-150 (Oct. 9, 1997) (footnote omitted), available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/
data/papersAndStudies/fc970353.pdf.
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B. Consolidationand Improvements in Network Quality
Gaining national geographic scope has allowed competing wireless
networks to better pursue technological upgrades and to roll out a richer
mix of services. The result is that the quality of wireless service has
improved markedly with the emergence of wider area networks. Uniform
systems, governed by uniform rules, have contributed substantially to this
crucial dimension of consumer satisfaction.
The integration of local systems into nationwide networks allowed for
economies of scale in developing advanced applications and in deploying
new technologies. Efficiencies were realized in research, in marketing, and
in purchasing of equipment for both operators (e.g., base stations) and
individual customers (e.g., handsets). In piecing together disparate network
elements, the coordination afforded the larger network often resulted in
cost savings and improved functionality.
In analyzing the merger between Bell Atlantic and GTE, which was
one of several major mergers creating a national wireless network, the FCC
predicted just this result, stating that "combining these wireless businesses
will likely produce... system-wide efficiencies through the common
network engineering, management, purchasing, and administrative
functions, leading to earlier and broader deployment of advanced wireless
services."' 43
While data are difficult to obtain, some evidence suggests that
consolidation has been associated with marked increases in the quality of
mobile phone usage. Mobile EcoSystem 2003, an industry advisory and
consulting firm, publishes the results of tests administered by Telephia, an
engineering firm, on the proportion of calls blocked or dropped by wireless
telephone subscribers. Although only data from the last two years (2001
and 2002) have been posted, they indicate that sharp improvements are
being made in wireless telephone reliability (Table 11). The consolidation
of independent local operators by seamless national networks is consistent
with such increases in quality.

143. Application of GTE Corp. and Bell At. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
15 F.C.C.R. 14032, para. 377, 20 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 989 (2000).

Number 11

CELLULAR PHONEREGULATION

203

Table 11. The Frequency of Dropped or Blocked
Wireless Telephone Calls"
Dropped Calls
2001
2002

1.66%
0.87%

Blocked Calls
2001
2002

3.59%
2.09%

Annual Improvement

47.6%

Annual Improvement

41.8%

V. FRAGMENTATION AND UNIFORMITY IN THE REGULATION OF
WIRELESS PHONE SYSTEMS
State regulation of wireless phone systems has collided with federal
jurisdiction in many respects, with substantial preemption taking place in
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA") and the
Telecommunication,; Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"). State regulation of cellular
rates was preempted in OBRA, along with other regulatory functions,
although the extent to which states are foreclosed from regulating has been
a subject of legal debate."' a The 1996 Act instituted further preemption,
particularly of local zoning restrictions, which inhibited the siting of towers
for wireless networks. Again, the extent to which state and local authorities
14 6
are prohibited from regulating is under debate.
The basic logic of federal preemption, however, appears clear. It was
detailed in a 1998 law review article by Leonard J. Kennedy and Heather
A. Purcell:
Because wireless networks increasingly operate on a multistate or on a
nationwide competitive basis and calls frequently traverse state
borders, Congress freed wireless carriers from the dual (federal and
state) regulatory jurisdictional system designed to regulate the
monopoly common carrier activities of the former Bell System and the

hundreds of independent telephone companies around the country
(such as GTE) that were not part of the Bell System. Congress
reasonably concluded that today's wireless networks differ
fundamentally from monopoly local exchange carriers. Indeed, a
wireless call to Virginia may originate in the District of Columbia,
while the caller drives across the state line to Maryland and the call is
144. Presentation: Mark Lowenstein, Mobile Ecosystem, State of the Wireless Industry
presented at the Pacific Research Institute Conference 5 (Apr. 15, 2003) (on file with the
Journal).
145. Kennedy & Purcell, supra note 7, at 547.
146. See Teske & Kuljiev, supra note 115, at 63. ("Thus, there is still no clear national
policy on when local governments can oppose telecommunications facilities based on
zoning considerations." )
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routed to and switched in New York. If CMRS providers were treated
like wireline carriers they would be forced to make artificial
distinctions so that their calls could be classified into historic state or
federal regulatory categories that would be antediluvian, unnecessary,
and harmful. The imposition of these outdated requirements
would
47
impede the development of wireless in the United States. 1
Jurisdictional issues are rarely settled in absolute terms, with federal
preemption foreclosing any local or state involvement. Substantial public
policy responsibility remains vested in state governments, for example,
even after regulatory authority for consumer protection issues-rates,
quality of service, contract disclosure-is placed in a federal agency. For
the policy interventions now under consideration by regulators at the state
and federal level, however, it is possible to categorize the efficiency
implications of alternative jurisdictions. In general, each of the major
regulatory proposals involves substantial jurisdictional externalities due to
the strong influence of national network economies in the wireless
telephone sector.
Advertising regulations. National marketing campaigns, including
commercial messages distributed to nationwide audiences, and highvisibility national events sponsored by wireless carriers, could be seriously
affected by advertising regulations. To introduce non-uniformity in such
rules would lead competitors to shy away from national advertising,
reducing any efficiencies to be gained in this realm.
Disclosure rules. The importance of national one rate plans in
promoting competition and network growth is substantial. Disclosure rules
can disrupt such marketing efficiencies by imposing different point-of-sale
procedures and conflicting requirements for what information must be
conveyed. Because some proposals (such as California's) consider
mandating lengthy written agreements and/or third-party verification to
ensure that subscribers understand contract terms, marketing practices
could be forced off line. Non-uniformity would reduce efficiencies
associated with telephone or Internet sign-ups, undermining investments in
these arrangements.
Minimum Trial Periods. The six national carriers currently offer free
trial periods of 14-30 days, during which telephone service can be
terminated without payment of an "early termination fee." 148 Terms
147. Kennedy & Purcell, supra note 7, at 550.
148. Cellular Telecommunication & Internet Ass'n, Proposed Wireless Regulations:
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extending this period in some states would alter carriers' incentives to offer
free or discounted telephones, lowering network utilization and, in the long
term, network development.
In essence, each of the proposals under consideration has the potential
to impose costs on wireless subscribers outside the state in which the costs
are levied. This is due to two factors. First, inefficient rules limiting
network development in one state tend to spill over in other jurisdictions.
Because costs and benefits are misaligned, suboptimal infrastructure
investment results. This lowers service quality when local subscribers roam
or when they attempt to call others on the network who rely on
infrastructure that is underdeveloped due to regulation. Second, because the
cost of rules falls, at least in part, on consumers on other states, regulators
will tend to ignore some of the costs they impose. The latter effect allows
regulators to free-ride; indeed, political constraints push them to do so, as
electoral power is undermined by focusing on outside interests at the
expense of constituents.
In the pattern seen among the examples above, competition between
the states can work well where locally provided services do not entail
substantial external effects. Where large interstate networks are involved,
however, spillovers occur and regulations are easier to harmonize at the
federal, rather than at the state, level. This appears to best describe wireless
networks, where strong national economies of scale and scope lead to the
emergence of efficient national-level system integration.

VI. STATE VS. FEDERAL WIRELESS REGULATION:
A NATURAL EXPERIMENT
In exploring the optimal jurisdiction question, direct evidence
revealing relative regulatory competencies is valuable but rare. Indirect
evidence is more likely to be available, leading one, for instance, to
compare the size of the professional staff at the Montana Public Service
Commission with that of the FCC. Similarly, some rely on anecdotal
evidence concerning the awareness of state versus federal regulators. A
recent episode involving a member of the California Public Utilities
Commission may be suggestive: "Henry Duque, a six-year member of the

$925 Million in Higher Rates and New Hassles for Consumers 3, available at
http://www.wow-com.com/PDF/CPUCbackground.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
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California Public Utilities Commission, testified Monday that he didn't
know until last year that his agency regulates the wireless
telecommunications industry."14' 9

The FCC does enjoy certain economies of scale in evaluating
nationwide data with a larger base of policy experts. It enjoys a work force
of over 2,000 full-time employees; has a Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau with staff attorneys, economists, engineers, and industry analysts
knowledgeable about mobile telephony; and issues detailed annual reports
evaluating the CMRS market for Congress. But how important is the
federal regulatory advantage in crafting policies that help consumers? After
all, dispersed experiments among the fifty states could contribute to a
process that overcomes the disadvantage attendant to any one state
commission's analysis by using trial and error to discover better modes of
regulation.
Fortunately, there exists a case study that puts the issue to the test. In
the 1993-94 federal deregulation of cellular telephone rates, alternative
jurisdictions took different sides of the issue. In that instance, federal rules
trumped those of state commissions, preempting rate regulations that many
states were imposing and sought to continue to impose. Because we can
now observe what happened to cellular rates following that federal
preemption of state regulation, it is possible to contrast the rival regulatory
positions. This is direct evidence as to which jurisdiction has most
effectively protected economic efficiency, and thus, consumer interests.
A. Federal Preemption and Deregulationof CellularRates in 1994
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993"50 preempted

regulation of cellular rates by the states as of August 10, 1994, one year
from the day of enactment.
The rationale for preemption was that the
FCC was responsible for spectrum allocation and licensing and, in this
capacity, was the logical nexus of authority for related regulatory
149. Associated Press, Duque Says He Didn't Know PUC Regulated Wireless Industry,
(Dec.
18,
2001),
available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/utilities/nw/
nw002128.php3. In fairness to Commissioner Duque, the position that the State of
California merely regulates wireless telephone carriers in a formalistic, ineffectual manner
since federal preemption of rate controls in 1994 (and possibly before) would be a
compelling argument backed by empirical support.
150. Pub. L. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
151. Petition of N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm'n to Extend Rate Reg., Report and Order,
10 F.C.C.R. 8187, paras 2-3, 78 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 251 (1995).
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decisionmaking. Specifically, in licensing other wireless entrants, only the
FCC could create consistent rules for direct competitors. Because
asymmetric regulation by the several states could clearly disrupt
competitive forces, Congress vested the national regulatory agency with
control over rates.
States that had been regulating cellular prices, however, were given
one year to petition the FCC to request authority to continue regulating.
Twenty-three states regulated rates in some way, and petitions to continue
rate regulation were filed by seven states.' 52 All were denied, and state
regulation was preempted.'53 The arguments employed by the states,
however, are of interest.
The petitioners argued that cellular telephone service was not fully
competitive; competitive entry would eliminate the need for regulation, but
not until competition actually arrived in the market. There was no telling
how long it would take the upcoming PCS licensees to become full-fledged
wireless telephone competitors, and until they were, state-level rate
54
controls were needed to protect consumers.
As the State of New York argued, "the market for cellular services is
not fully competitive, and, therefore, state regulation, as it is employed in
New York, serves as a deterrence to anticompetitive and discriminatory
152. See supra Table 12.
153. See Petition of Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, to Extend State Auth. Over Rate and Entry
Reg. of All Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., Report and Order and Order on
Reconsideration, Pr. Dkt. No. 94-104 (May 19, 1995), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/Wireless/Orders/1995/fcc95190.txt; Petition on Behalf of the La. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n for Auth. To Retain Existing Jurisdiction over Commercial Mobile Radio Servs.
Offered Within the State of Louisiana, Report and Order, Pr. Dkt. No. 94-107 (May 19,
1995), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Orders/1995/fcc95191.txt;
Petition of N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm'n to Extend Rate Reg., Report and Order,PR Dkt.
No. 94-108 (May 19, 1995), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/
Orders/1995/fcc95192.txt; Petition of the State of Ohio for Auth. to Continue to Regulate
Commercial Mobile Servs., Report and Order, PR Dkt. No. 94-109 (May 19, 1995),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Orders/1995/fcc95193.txt; Petition on
Behalf of the State of Hawaii, Pub. Util. Comm'n, for Auth. To Extend its Rate Reg. of
Commercial Mobile Radio Servs. in the State of Hawaii, Report and Order, PR Dkt. No. 94103 (May 19, 1995), available at http://www.fcc.gov/BureausWireless/Orders/1995/
fcc95194.txt; Petition of the Conn. Dep't Pub. Util. Control to Retain Reg. Control of the
Rates of Wholesale Cellular Serv. Providers in the State of Connecticut, Report and Order,
10 F.C.C.R. 7025 (1995); Petition of the People of the State of California and the Pub. Utils.
Comm'n of the State of California to Retain Reg. Auth. over Intrastate Cellular Serv. Rates,
Report and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 7486, 78 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 108 (1995).
154. See, e.g., CaliforniaCPUCFiling,supra note 135, at 19, 67.
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practices."' 55 This is not an implausible argument, and it is now testable.
There are costs as well as benefits inherent in public policy. Customers,
firms, and regulators respond to constraints in multiple ways. Moreover,
the ability of regulators to successfully constrain prices, given limited
information about costs, demands, substitutes, and technology, cannot
simply be assumed.
Curiously, evidence that state regulation proved ineffectual was
introduced-and then ignored. New York regulators conceded that, "In
general, cellular companies have been lightly regulated by this
Commission."' 56 In fact, cellular operators did file tariffs with the New
York State Public Service Commission, but regulators engaged in no
substantial review of such rates (established by the firms themselves)." 7
The appeal to postpone preemption was made, therefore, on the
grounds that continuing the threat of substantive regulatory intervention
was constraining duopoly cellular pricing. "However, the Commission
retained the discretion to impose the stricter regulation permitted by the
' The
Public Service Law should it appear necessary." 158
California petition
made similar claims, complaining that state rate regulation had failed to
suppress prices but pleading for the opportunity to continue setting "just
and reasonable" rates. In particular, the California Public Utilities
Commission ("CPUC") paradoxically based its request for continued rate
regulation on the finding that, "Cellular rates in California are among the

155. Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Petition to
Extend Rate Regulation, PR No. 94-108, at 3 (Aug. 9, 1994) (citation omitted) [hereinafter
New York FCC Filing]. The petition also stated: "[Aibsent a fully competitive market,
continued light rate regulation is required to ensure that rates do not become discriminatory,
unjust or unreasonable." Id. at 4 (footnote omitted). Similarly, California regulators
conceded that despite rate regulation, "[p]rices of wholesale cellular carriers [i.e., cellular
networks] in California are highest in the nation and have remained high despite declining
capital and operating costs." California CPUC FCC Filing, supra note 136, at 7. This did
not dissuade the CPUC from arguing that regulation was "necessary to protect cellular
consumers from unjust and unreasonable rates." Id. at 64.
156. New York FCC Filing, supra note 155, at app. III, p. 5.
157. Shew, supra note 136, at 21 ("Price caps are proposed by operators and are not
subjected to any test of reasonableness by the [New York Public Service] commission, so
there appears to be no effective regulation.").
158. New York FCC Filing,supra note 155, at app. III, p. 5.
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highest in the nation, and have failed to decline commensurate with
substantial declines in capital and operating costs of providing cellular
service."

15

1

California noted that it "allowed the cellular industry to set retail rates
for any service plan based on what the market would bear and not on
CoSt. ' 16° This regulatory approach was adopted due to the fact that state
regulators had limited knowledge about how to deal with an evolving
market. "Because the cellular market was relatively new at the time, the
CPUC adopted a hands-off approach to rate regulation, hoping the rates
would come down in time as economies of scale occurred and16 1the cost of
doing business declined. Unfortunately, this has not occurred."'

159. California CPUCFiling, supra note 136, at ii.
160. Id. at 12.
161. Id. at 38-39.
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Table 12. State Regulation of Cellular Telephone Service (Jan. 1993) 161
Not Regulated

Partially

Regulated

Regulated
Alabama
Colorado
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Texas
Washington
Wisconsin
29 Jurisdictions

Filed Petition With FCC to
Continue Regulation(1994)

Arizona
Arkansas
Connecticut
Illinois
Kentucky
Mississippi
New Mexico
Ohio
South Caolina
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Wyoming

Alaska
California
Hawaii
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Nevada
New York
West Virginia
Puerto Rico

Arizona
California
Connecticut
Hawaii
Louisiana
Ohio
New York

14 Jurisdictions

9 Jurisdictions

8 Jurisdictions

Whatever the merits of state rate regulation in 1994, we now have an
opportunity to test the hypothesis advanced by state commissions which
regulated rates. 63 As the CPUC put it: "Nevertheless, the presence of rate
regulation has probably prevented rates from being even higher and
certainly has not contributed to higher rates.""1 But the claim is not
accompanied by analysis. It is an empirical question as to whether state
regulation was causing cellular telephone rates to rise or fall. California's
162. CELLULAR TELECOMM. INDUS. Ass'N, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON STATE REGULATION
(Jan. 1993); FCC Announces Establishment of Dkts. for Materials Filed in Connection with
State Petition for Auth. to Regulate Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Rates, Public Notice,
10 F.C.C.R. 751 (1994).
163. The fact that not all states regulated rates does not diminish the usefulness of the
test. When efficient, regulatory decentralization improves consumer welfare overall.
164. California CPUCFiling, supra note 136, at 46.
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rules allowed operators to set initial tariffs and then to file for permission to
change rates. This provided asymmetric incentives where rate increases are
anticipated to be more difficult to obtain than rate decreases, predictably
raising rates by slowing rate reductions. In any event, elimination of state
rate regulation allows one to evaluate whether postregulation market
evidence indicates that proconsumer regulation was, in fact, applied.
B. Aggregate National Price and Usage Trends
The effect of state regulation of cellular telephone rates is first
observed with national price and subscriber penetration trends. If state
regulators effectively limited quality-adjusted prices, then releasing this
constraint would result in a price increase. Costs would quickly rise for
consumers, and subscriber growth would slow or reverse. This could be
true even if the observed price differences across states did not favor
consumers in regulated jurisdictions. As New York argued in its 1994
petition, the mere threat of state rate regulation constrained prices charged
by operators. 65 With state regulators powerless to roll back rates because
of federal preemption, cellular rates would be predicted to increase
noticeably. This increase would manifest itself in two ways: a sharp rise in
cellular rates, and a decline in consumer growth.
Rather than raise rates over an extended period of time, cellular
operators would set prices at market levels with state regulatory constraints
removed. 66 Rate increases should be visible in aggregate national data
during the 1993-95 period surrounding rate deregulation via federal
preemption (effective August 10, 1994).
Given the negative relationship between price and quantity
demanded, consumers should respond to rate increases by reducing the
amount of wireless service purchased. This is probably best measured by
minutes of use ("MOU"), which reflects consumption by both new and

165. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
166. In some contexts, it is argued that firms price strategically to prevent regulation. But
this is implausible in this instance. The national market was highly deconcentrated, and the
probability that an individual operator's price increase would result in reregulation was
virtually nonexistent. As Shew notes, the cable industry faced the threat of federal
reregulation in 1992, but rates appeared unaffected through debate and passage of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. See Shew, supra note 136, at
29 n.27.
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existing subscribers. Subscriber growth also reflects changes in service
quality, providing an important cross-check on rate data167
In fact, however, average national cellular rates declined appreciably
in the immediate postregulation period. In 1993, the average price per
MOU was $.57. In 1995, it declined to $.51, a reduction of nearly 12%.6'
The reduction does not appear to have been due to long-term trends
preceding rate deregulation. In fact, during the 1991-93 period, the average
price per MOU increased 10.5%. Output growth, whether measured by
total U.S. MOU or by subscribership, also appears strong in the period
following deregulation. MOU, in percentage terms, grew 36% faster in the
two-year period straddling federal preemption of state regulation than in
the same period preceding deregulation. Given the higher base from which
they started, it is surprising that both usage and subscribership grew faster
in percentage terms in the later period. 169

Table 13. Rates and Usage Around 1994 Federal Preemption
of State Regulation of Cellular Telephone Rates 7 '

0.51

1991-1993
(% change)
11.76%

1993-1995
(% change)
-10.53%

37.8
33.8

71.43%
110.53%

96.88%
111.25%

Metric

1991

1993

1995

Price
(dollars)/MOU
MOU (billions)
Subscribers

0.51

0.57

11.2
7.6

19.2
16.0

(millions)

I

167. That is because falling rates may be associated with quality reductions (or
increasing rates with quality improvements). All else remaining constant, demand exhibits a
negative relationship between price and quantity, but price and quantity can be positively
correlated without violating the Law of Demand when quantity is changing. Examining
subscriber (or MOU) growth in response to regulatory changes allows consumers to respond
to both price and quality changes.
168. See infra Table 13.
169. Price and usage data from Table 13, supra.
170. Price and usage data from Table 3, supra.
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There is no evidence that the national wireless market suffered ill
effects from federal preemption of state rate regulation in 1994. At an
aggregated, national level, price and output have both responded positively.
The proconsumer improvements may not be due to deregulation, and FCC
reports tend to attribute the rate declines beginning about the time of
federal preemption to the anticipated entry of PCS competitors. What can
be said, however, is that the prediction of several state public service
commissions is rejected by marketplace evidence. State regulation did not
generally lower rates or benefit consumers.
It is important to remember that this test of state jurisdiction takes
place prior to the entry of new PCS licensees, which began providing
service in a few markets in late 1995 or early 1996. The pro-consumer
outcomes cannot be directly ascribed to a change in market structure.
While the coming of PCS was quite possibly a factor motivating service
improvements by cellular operators bracing for intensifying competitive
pressures, state regulators pleaded for continued rate regulation authority
knowing that the PCS rulemaking was proceeding and that new licenses
were likely to be issued. California's petition stated: "We envision that in
the not too distant future market forces of competition will police the
mobile market and allow for an orderly withdrawal of government
oversight.' ' 1 Yet, the California petition saw state regulation as keeping
rates at levels that were "just and reasonable," and predicted that were state
controls not to continue, consumers would be adversely affected. The
national data appear to contradict this view.
More dramatic, of course, were the improvements in price, usage, and
functionality that drove the wireless telephone market in the late 1990s.
With the arrival of new competitors, prices declined to 11.50 per MOU in
2002 (see fig. 3), and total annual MOU rose to over 600 billion. Given that
regulators in California and other states established pre-1994 cellular rates
as "just and reasonable," it now appears that regulation was entirely
ineffective-relative to pro-competitive policies instituted at the federal
level-in protecting consumer interests.

171. CaliforniaCPUCFiling, supra note 136, at 80 (footnote omitted).
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Figure 3. Average Wireless $CostlMin. 1989-200272
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Source:
CTIA Wireless ndusy Survey and CMRS Repors.
1989-1993 Top 6 Subciber dam fromKidderPeabody& Co., Wireless World: The Mobile Telephone[odusty (Spring 1994), p. 16.

C. Cross-SectionalAnalysis of State Rate Regulation
A few studies analyze price differences during the period prior to
federal preemption. As some states regulated cellular rates and others did
not, observing differences in pricing between the jurisdictions may show
the effectiveness of state regulation. In general, rates appear to have been
higher in regulated markets. The key question is how to interpret the causal
connection between the two variables of regulatory status and market
prices.
The first issue that arises in cross-sectional studies of cellular rate
regulation is how to define the prevailing control regime. State rules differ
widely and are not simply categorized as "regulated" or "unregulated."
Some states banned cellular regulation by statute, while others simply
failed to regulate rates due to explicit or implicit actions taken by the state's
public service commission. Those states that imposed rate rules on cellular
carriers did so in different ways. Some states regulated the rates charged to
cellular resellers, others regulated the retail rates, and some regulated both.
Some states capped rates based on "market prices," while others
established rates based on rate-of-return regulation. Some states simply
required that tariffs be filed, others required that notice be given for
172. See supra Table 3.
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changes, and others required that permission to change rates be obtained.
Abstracting from many of these details, the CTIA, the principal trade
association of cellular operators,' 73 categorized regulatory regimes.' 74
Shew, who provides his own regulatory classifications, compared
prices across regimes. He adjusted for demographic and economic
characteristics of local markets while examining rates charged in 95
cellular markets for the years 1985, 1988, and 1991. He discovered prices
were typically higher when regulated, but not (in two of three regressions)
by statistically significant margins. He concluded that, "The results71 5provide
no evidence that customers have benefited from price regulation."'
Another study uses a distinct data set to arrive at roughly similar
conclusions. Tomaso Duso examined cellular telephone service charges
across 122 U.S. markets during the December 1984 to July 1988 period. 76
This study found that prices in regulated markets were somewhat higher
than those found in unregulated markets, but that these differences are
generally not statistically significant. Moreover, the "cost drivers" which
appear significant in explaining prices in estimated regressions were
usually slightly higher in regulated markets. This begs the question of
causality, which cannot be answered directly by statistical analysis. Yet, the
evidence tends to reject the hypothesis that rate regulation is associated
with gains for consumers.
D. Penetrationin DeregulatedStates After FederalPreemption
One issue brought up in the Duso study is whether or not states that
were regulated prior to 1994 were systematically different than states that
were not. If so, and if these differences were entirely independent of the
regulatory regimes implemented, then the positive correlation between
higher rates and state regulation (as found by Shew) would not suggest that
the latter caused the former. One way to shed light on this question is to see
how prices or subscriber growth perform in the postregulation period.

173. CTIA is still the acronym for the industry trade group, but its full name has been
changed to the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association. See the organization
Web site, at http://www.wow-com.com/.
174. See supra Table 12.
175. Shew, supra note 136, at 35.
176. ToMAso Duso, LOBBYING AND REGULATION IN A POLITICAL ECONOMY: EVIDENCE
FROM THE US CELLULAR INDUSTRY 8 (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, Discussion Paper FS
IV, 2001), availableat http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/2001/ivOl-03.pdf.
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Table 14. Penetration Rates in Deregulated vs. Unregulated
Top 10 Cellular Markets, 1990-2001177
Markets in Regulated States

New York

March
1990
1.50%

September
1996
5.40%

December
2001
47.00%

Los Angeles

2.30%

10.50%

46.00%

Boston

3.10%

17.30%

47.00%

San Francisco

1.80%

13.40%

49.00%

Weighted Avg.
Markets in UnregulatedStates

1.96%

9.64%

47.00%

Washington-Baltimore

March
1990
3.20%

September
1996
18.80%

2000
Census
53.00%

Philadelphia

2.40%

13.80%

48.00%

Chicago

3.40%

20.30%

49.00%

Detroit

3.40%

26.50%

51.00%

Houston

2.30%

17.90%

50.00%

Dallas

2.50%

18.10%

46.00%

Weighted Avg.

2.95%

19.27%

49.50%

Table 14 summarizes the quarterly wireless subscriber data for the top
ten U.S. markets from 1990-1996.118 The regulated markets consist of New
York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston. This classification is
based on a 1994 CPUC report 1' and is consistent with categorizations by
177. CMRS Seventh Annual Report, supra note 131, app. C, table 3. Herschel Shosteck

Associates, Data Flash: The Cellular Market Quarterly Review, 10 Quarterly Rev., Sept.
1996 [hereinafter Shosteck].
178. Data from cities outside the top ten markets are not available from Shosteck and are
exceedingly difficult to obtain.
179. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Investigation on the Comm'n's Own Motion into Mobile
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the CTIA. 8 ° These data allow for an analysis that abstracts from complex
pricing issues. Subscriber levels are a rough indicator of consumer
satisfaction. The higher the growth rate relative to an underlying trend
determined by nonregulatory variables, the better the bundle delivered to
customers, as evaluated by customers themselves, (taking prices, service
quality, customer service, and all other product dimensions into account).' 8 '
Two things are apparent from Table 14. The first is that penetration
(subscribers as a percent of local market population) in regulated markets
was considerably below the levels in unregulated markets in 1990 and
1996. The second is that penetration in regulated markets had nearly caught
up to levels in other markets by 2001.182 This broadly supports Shew's
conclusion that regulation was associated with higher rates.
In states with regulation, three impediments to price competition
existed. First, when tariffs are publicly filed, changes are quickly
communicated to competitors, often by law, and in advance of actual price
reductions. Shew found this had a very large potential effect on prices, and
it is easy to see how this would reduce incentives to engage in price
competition.' 83 Second, requiring tariff changes to be approved by utility
commissions deters firms from lowering rates because operators face a cost
in requesting permission to raise rates back to previous levels, should
demand conditions change. Third, since operators working under rate-ofTel. Serv. and Wireless Comms., Decision No. 94-08-022, 1994 Cal. PUC LEXIS 487, app.
2 (Aug. 3, 1994) [hereinafter CPUC1994 Decision].
180. One question that arises relates to the categorization of Illinois as a partially
regulated state in the listing compiled by the CTIA. See supra Table 12. This is resolved by
Shew, supra note 136, at 21, which provides a more detailed description of state regulatory
regimes, noting that the Illinois Commerce Commission eliminated cellular rate regulation
in a 1988 ruling, which phased out price controls from 1988 to1990. Shew also notes that,
while New York regulators imposed price caps, the caps were "proposed by operators and
[are] not subjected to any test of reasonableness by the commission, so there appears to be
no effective regulation." Id.
181. One weakness of the penetration metric is that it does not reflect changes in usage
by inframarginal customers. So, if subscribers use their wireless telephones more, but not
many new individuals subscribe, consumer gains may not be evident. There is little
evidence that trends in minutes of use and subscriber levels actually diverge, however, so it
is reasonable to use either as proxies for consumer preferences.
182. This is true even when New York City is eliminated from the analysis. As noted
above, New York was considered a regulated state in CPUC analysis and by the CTIA, but
was seen as having a nonbinding price cap regime by Shew, supra note 136, at 21.
Moreover, the Shosteck data for New York City are highly variable and appear to contain
errors.
183. Shew, supra note 136, at 35-37.
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return or price cap regimes have substantial input as to where price levels
are initially set, they will tend to favor higher prices when they believe that
price reductions will be easier to obtain than rate increases. Effectively,
high rates become an insurance policy against "get tough" policies by
regulators.
In any event, the difference in the ratio of penetration rates (regulated
to unregulated markets) narrows considerably during the seven years
following federal preemption. By December 2001, previously regulated
markets have about 47% mobile phone penetration, while the neverregulated markets have penetration rates of about 49.5%.184 The factors
limiting wireless phone use appear to have faded not immediately (see
1996 data) but over time.
Table 15. Starting Dates for Regulated and
Unregulated Cellular Systems'

Cellular License
(Wireline)

B

85

Cellular License
(Nonwireline)

New York

April 1984

April 1986

Los Angeles

June 1984

March 1987

San Francisco

April 1985

September 1986

Boston

January 1985

January 1985

Chicago

October 1983

Washington, D.C.

April 1984

January 1985
December 1983

Philadelphia

July 1984

February 1986

Detroit

October 1984

July 1985

Houston

September 1984

May 1986

Dallas

July 1984

March 1986

A

A factor that may explain this pattern is the initial tardiness of the
cellular operators to offer service in regulated markets. By the time that the
last regulated system in our sample, the nonwireline licensee in Los
Angeles, began serving customers in March 1987, nonwireline licensees in
86
unregulated states had been operating for an average of twenty months.
184. See supra Table 14.
185. PAUL KAGAN ASSOCIATES, INC., KAGAN CELLULAR TELEPHONE ATLAS 139, 151,

165, 191, 193, 221, 243, and 261 (1998).
186. See supra Table 15.
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The average time in the regulated sample was 10.75 months. Two of the
four regulated nonwireline licensees opened for business after all six
unregulated systems had begun operations, mirroring the relative entry
delay among wireline licensees. This substantial head start clearly put the
unregulated systems in the pole position in the race for subscribers.
Whether the regulated system lag was related to state rate regulation is
unknown.

25.00%

Figure 4. Wireless Subscriber Penetration Growth Befor 88nd After Federal
Preemption of State Rate Regulation
Federal PreeTption

20.00/
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%

A

Never Regulated

*

Regulated -

Predicted Never Regulated -

Predicted Regulated

What is known, as illustrated in Figure 4, is that subscriber growth
across both sets of markets is higher in the post-preemption years. If the
Shosteck quarterly data are truncated at September 1994 (the first month
federal cellular deregulation was imposed on the states), it is seen that both
regulated and unregulated markets experience higher penetration gains in
percentage terms. An important argument for this policy reform was that
eliminating state-by-state rate regulation would result in greater efficiencies
in the provision of regional or national networks, and that such economies
would result in consumer gains. The observed increases in subscriber
growth are consistent with this view.
They are also consistent with the hypothesis that state regulation of
wireless telephony has effects that spill over into other states. National
wireless penetration appears to respond positively to federal preemption,
providing a strong argument that the policy was efficient. It is buttressed by
187. Shosteck, supra note 177.

220
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the fact that subscriber growth is higher everywhere after preemption, not
just in deregulated states. Subscriber growth in states that were unregulated
exceeds growth in states deregulated through federal preemption, through
1996.188 This supports the view that wireless telephone regulation is
properly based at the federal level.

Table 16. Quarterly Penetration Growth
(March 1990 to September 1996)89
PreSept.
1994

PostSept.
1994

Ratio

0.25%

0.58%

2.29

Markets not under
Regulation

0.37%

1.05%

2.86

Ratio

1.44

1.81

Markets
under
Starte Reul
n
State Regulation

E. Summary of the NaturalExperiment
The evidence is strong that consumers did not benefit from state
regulation of cellular telephone rates. During the period prior to federal
preemption, rates tended to be higher in regulated markets, and some of
this difference may have been due to inefficiencies imposed by state rules
(including higher lag times for market entry). After federal preemption,
rates did not shoot up in regulated states, or across markets generally. This
surge in rates would have occurred if state regulation, or the threat of state
regulation, were constraining prices for customers. Importantly, even in
markets where incumbent duopoly providers possessed substantial pricing
power, 9 ° state regulators proved unable to (a) protect consumers via rate
188. See infra Table 16.
189. Shosteck, supra note 177.
190. The California Public Utilities Commission generously cited my work in
establishing that cellular providers possessed market power. CPUC 1994 Decision, supra
note 180. But the existence of less than ideal competitive conditions does not establish that
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regulation, and (b) learn from their policy experiment, arguing for a
continuation of price controls and against federal preemption. Due to the
failure of such arguments to carry the day, and to the ultimate success of
deregulation (including preemption of state price caps), we conclude that
state cellular regulation did not benefit consumers. This finding can be used
to evaluate federal preemption of other state regulatory rules.

VII. CONCLUSION
In their lengthy law review article analyzing the optimal jurisdiction
for determining when federal, as opposed to state, antitrust regulation was
appropriate, Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld propose a seven-part
test.1 91 The results of this approach suggest that federal preemption of state
regulatory intervention is appropriate when the following three questions
can be answered in the affirmative: First, "[i]s the proposed national
regulatory activity justifiably national in scope involving national
externalities?" Next, "[i]s the proposed regulatory activity.., efficiently
provided at the national level?" Finally, "[d]o the potential efficiency
advantages of the proposed legislation outweigh the likely loss of political
participation when policies are decided at the national rather than at the
state level?"' 92 Economic analysis of the wireless telephone industry
provides the answers to these questions--each in the affirmative. The first
and second questions are answered jointly: the industry is clearly
characterized by strong national network effects, and policies adopted by a
company or a state regulatory authority in one part of the country tend to
have important implications for consumers and carriers in other parts of the
country.
The drop in per-minute charges from more than $.50 per minute in the
mid-1990s to just above $.10 today has been accompanied by two distinct,
reinforcing trends: competitive entry and national network consolidation.
Mobile wireless services are efficiently provided, packaged, and sold via
regulation can do better. This crucial point has often been noted by economist Alfred Kahn,
who writes that "society's choices are always between or among imperfect systems, but that,
wherever it seems likely to be effective, even very imperfect competition is preferable to
regulation." ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS, xxiii (1988 ed.) (citation omitted).

191. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory
Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1290 (1997).
192. Id.
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national service plans. This has been learned, not assumed, as regulation
initially forced an atomistic licensing grid on the industry. The wireless
phone industry employed innovative products and business models,
specifically traced by the FCC to the introduction of AT&T's "Digital One
Rate" plan in May 1998, to discover a more efficient organizational
structure. 93 Analyses by the FCC repeatedly stress the importance of
seamless wireless networks in meeting customer demands. Many of these
comments are found in Appendix 1. One representative observation is this
passage from the Fourth Annual CMRS Services Report issued in 1999:
[O]perators with larger footprints can achieve economies of scale and
increased efficiencies compared to operators with smaller footprints.
The need for this increased size was exacerbated in the past year by the
introduction and success of AT&T's DOR plan and, in particular, its
low-cost roaming feature. According to analysts, it can be significantly
more expensive for regional operators to provide customers with this
feature than for national operators. 194
Competitive rivalry has pushed all firms to adapt, seizing the
efficiencies of national scope to offer the services-and prices--demanded
by consumers. Local service provision has been replaced by aggregation of
thousands of wireless licenses and nationalization of service plans offered
to subscribers. Subscribers have rewarded companies providing
harmonized wireless telephone networks, and idiosyncratic state regulatory
regimes threaten such efficiencies.
The last hurdle to be cleared in the Inman-Rubinfeld test is a political
judgment. Does federal preemption, when resulting in economic efficiency,
also rationalize legislative decisionmaking? Fortunately, we have a direct
test of the competency of federal vs. state regulatory efforts, which embed
the political advantages of federalism (giving broad discretion to state
policymakers). The test is the consumer protection offered by state rate
regulation of cellular telephony.
When preempted by federal legislation in 1993 and decisions by the
FCC in 1994 (denying state petitions to continue regulation beyond the
August 10, 1994, preemption enacted by Congress), market evidence
reveals state price regulation failed to protect consumers. Rates in regulated
states were generally higher than rates in unregulated states prior to federal
preemption. Service provision in regulated states appears to have lagged

193. See supra Table 3.
194. CMRS Fourth Annual Report, supra note 121, pp. 10159-60 (footnotes omitted).
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(started later) than in unregulated states. Cross-sectional multivariate
studies prior to preemption suggest that states imposing rate regulation
featured rates that were higher than those of other states, and subscriber
growth appears to rise faster in previously regulated states after federal
preemption. Federal policymakers pursued a pro-consumer path in
deregulating cellular rates and awarding new licenses to PCS operators.
Prices declined rapidly after preemption, belying the predictions of price
increases made by state regulatory commissions attempting to extend
controls. These included the best-staffed and most expert of the state
commissions, those of California and New York. The CPUC conducted an
extensive investigation in the cellular telephone market and offered this
assessment of regulation in August 1994:
[E]ven though the cellular rates of major California carriers remain
among the most expensive in the nation, as indicated by the NCRA
[National Cellular Resellers Association] study, at least they have not
significantly increased their rates.... We believe that the presence of
regulation in California served as a restraint on carriers' tendency to
raise rates when compared with carriers in other states which do not
regulate carriers. 95
This analysis was faulty even prior to the empirical evidence gleaned
following federal preemption. California regulators argued that high prices
were no more of a problem to consumers than rising prices, which is
clearly false. California consumers are not compensated for the higher
prices they paid by the knowledge that at least these high prices were
stable. Under a regime of deregulated federal preemption, on the other
hand, California consumers have been compensated in cash. With
nationwide service plans, and rapidly falling prices among national
networks, they have had the opportunity to save money along with
consumers in other states.
Moreover, the empirical evidence that was soon to become available
reveals that, following preemption, rates did not increase when caps were
removed. Rate regulation had no effect, at best. At worst, it actually raised
rates by reducing competitive forces and introducing incentives for firms to
delay price reductions.
The federal preemption of state cellular rate regulation shows that
decentralized political decisionmaking did not add value for customers.
Today's market, which has generated great increases in efficiency by
195. CPUC 1994 Decision, supra note 180, at *74.
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developing six competing national networks, owes much to regulatory
harmonization, suggesting that the results of a reverse experiment today
would likewise underscore the deleterious effects of balkanization. As one
prominent industry analyst notes, "Regulatory initiatives such as the
proposed 'Bill of Rights' legislation [in California] . . could have a
disruptive effect on the industry."' 9 6 It would be ironic that, after spending
more than a decade piecing thousands of fragmentary cellular telephone
licenses into efficient national networks, resulting efficiencies could be at
least partly undone by disparate state regulatory regimes that left the
industry with a patchwork of conflicting rules.

196. Mark Lowenstein, Mobile Ecosystem, The Wireless Industry at Mid-Year (June
2003), at http://www.m-ecosystem.com/newsletter_603.html (June 2003).
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Appendix 1.
Key FCC Findings Regarding Competition, Consolidation,
and Regulation of Wireless Telephone Networks, 1995-2002

In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, First Report, 10 F.C.C.R. 8844,
(1995) (footnotes omitted).
Pages
8845

8845

8846
8849

8856

8864

Excerpt
"CMRS is a part of the telecommunications business that is undergoing
major changes that have resulted in growing competition, convergence
and popularity, all under a system of reduced regulation."
"Cellular service in automobiles and via portable telephones has become
a universally recognized business tool, and its providers have recently
begun to target their marketing strategies towards the mass consumer
market."
"CMRS may become a single market of telecommunications for 'people
on the move."'
"Second, because lotteries are not necessarily won by the applicants that
value the licenses most, many licenses, particularly for Block A, were
initially won by persons who later sold their licenses to more
experienced telecommunications providers for substantial sums of
money."
"The Commission is also replacing its traditional licensing of individual
base stations by regulations that allow wide-area licensing similar to that
for cellular systems .... Thus, while [Specialized Mobile Radio's]
service areas generally encompass local markets, they will increasingly
be able to expand easily to serve regional and nationwide markets.
Moreover, while there are thousands of SMRs in the United States, there
is a trend towards consolidation which may leave one to three large
SMRs per market, plus a fringe of smaller SMRs."
"The Commission's Third CMRS Report and Order contained an
analysis of trends in CMRS and found that the direction is away from a
'balkanized view' that sees cellular, SMRs, paging, etc., competing in
separate markets:
[g]rowth in the wireless marketplace is bringing with it an
increasing degree of service convergence. Technology and
consumer demand, facilitated by our general policy not to
restrict the services that can be provided over any particular
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band, are prompting commercial service providers to follow
marketing strategies that blur the differences between the
various services comprising the wireless marketplace."
"The principal force driving this convergence, the Commission noted,
was the desire of carriers to meet the demand of their customers for
'one-stop shopping,' the ability to buy at one place a mixture of different
mobile services. For its part, the Commission emphasized that its policy
is to allow such convergence."
"Already, there is evidence of declining cellular prices and increasing
features, which has been attributed to PCS's approach. Also adding to
the blurring and intensity would be any Commission action that
facilitates the consolidation of small SMRs into wide-area systems
providing mobile telephone service."
"Broader geographic markets have been asserted on several grounds.
First, some carriers are offering 'regional' service options, which give
customers flat-rate calling areas as large as a whole state. At the present
time, however, such plans (and customers using them) are the exception,
not the rule. Second, most mobile radio services are provided by large
regional or national corporations, and there is case law holding that the
relevant geographic market is nationwide when a service, even a local
one, is provided uniformly across the nation by centrally managed
companies. Third, the industry and some analysts speak increasingly of
customers demanding 'seamless service.' However, this may show
simply that some customers want a recognized national brand name on a
product that remains essentially local. In sum, while there is evidence
that regional and national markets may be emerging, it appears that the
vast majority of mobile radio services are provided in local and
metropolitan geographic markets under current conditions."
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227

In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Second Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 11266
(1997).
Page
11269

11272

11273

11277

11281

11284
11310

Excerpt
"Our examination of the commercial mobile radio services (CMRS)
industry indicates that competition in the mobile marketplace is
emerging... as many as four new competitors have been licensed to
provide CMRS in each market throughout the Nation."
"Mobile telecommunications initially consisted largely of discrete
services that did not compete with each other to any significant degree,
were used by relatively few customers, and were regulated in a
traditional public utility manner by the Commission and by most
states."
"This trend towards reduced regulation is continuing, as the
Commission is licensing geographic area SMR systems that can
compete on a more equal footing with cellular service and PCS to meet
a variety of consumer and business needs."
"[L]ack of uniformity has significant implications for cellular carriers
as well, particularly those that seek to meld their cellular and
seamless,
nationwide
PCS properties
into
a
broadband
telecommunications service that bundles wireless, local, long distance,
and paging into a single product under a nationally recognized brand
name."
"The second half of 1995 and 1996 have witnessed continued
consolidation among major cellular operators. Much of this
consolidation has occurred in a continuing effort to create national and
supra-regional footprints of cellular coverage."
"Greater geographic scope has broadened the number of pricing
packages as well."
"Traditionally, SMRs were small, independent companies, unaffiliated
with larger communications companies. The SMR environment has
changed considerably in the last few years. The Commission recently
changed its Rules to permit telephone companies and their affiliates
(e.g., cellular companies) to own SMRs.... This will facilitate the
implementation of new spectrum efficient technologies and enable
small SMRs to consolidate into wide-area SMRs. Thus, while SMRs'
service areas generally encompass local markets, they will increasingly
be able to expand easily to serve regional and nationwide markets."
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In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Third Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 19746
(1998).
Pages
19766-67

Excerpt
"The process of license consolidation in the mobile telephone market
discussed in the Second Report continues to occur. In general,
operators are acquiring new licenses to gain the efficiencies of larger
and/or more cohesive footprints and the marketing possibilities of
multiple product offerings. To date, consolidation has not
significantly reduced the number of providers of a given service
within a geographic market. Most of the activity in the CMRS license
secondary market over the past year fits into three categories:
footprint expansion, footprint refinement, and rural investment.
Footprint Expansion. Since the first cellular licenses were granted,
mobile telephone operators have been accumulating licenses to
expand their footprints into new regions in hopes of capitalizing on
the various efficiencies associated with economies of scale....
FootprintRefinement. In addition to the outright acquisition of new
wireless licenses, operators often exchange licenses with other
operators to fill in gaps around their existing clusters. In one of the
largest examples in the past year, United States Cellular Corporation
("US Cellular") and BellSouth Corporation ("BellSouth") swapped
34 cellular licenses. US Cellular received a controlling interest in 12
licenses around its existing service areas in Wisconsin and Illinois. In
return, BellSouth obtained ownership interests in 22 licenses, most of
which were situated around its existing clusters in Kentucky and
Tennessee."

19772-73

"AT&T Corp. ("AT&T"), Sprint PCS, and Nextel are all in the
process of deploying systems that will allow them to offer seamless
coverage throughout most of the country on their own networks.
Sprint PCS' licenses will allow it to reach the largest number of
potential customers with unduplicated coverage of approximately 243
million POPs. AT&T and Nextel are close behind with 234 million
and 230 million unduplicated POPs. It is important to note that
because Nextel's coverage is based on SMR licenses with smaller
amounts of spectrum, it has a lower total of MHz-POPs than its two
nationwide competitors.The next category of mobile telephone
operators consists of those who are executing large regional
strategies, or super-regions. This group includes LECs relying on
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their cellular and broadband PCS licenses (e.g., BellSouth, SBC, and
GTE Corp. ("GTE")) and pure wireless operators who are relying
almost entirely on their broadband PCS licenses (e.g., NextWave
Telecom, Inc. ("NextWave"), Omnipoint Corp. ("Omnipoint"), and
PrimeCo Personal Communications L.P. ("PrimeCo")). In order to
compete against those operators with nationwide footprints, some
operators have formed alliances designed to simulate a national
presence. For example, PrimeCo has signed a roaming agreement
with its two partner companies (Bell Atlantic Corp. ("Bell Atlantic")
and Airtouch Communications, Inc. ("Airtouch")) that will allow its
broadband PCS customers to access their wireless service on cellular
networks covering two-thirds of the nation's POPs, including 35 of
the top 50 cities. In addition, thirteen broadband PCS operators have
formed the North American GSM Alliance to facilitate roaming
throughout North America for customers using Global System for
Mobile Communications ("GSM") mobile telephones."
"So far this year, broadband PCS licensees have entered into several
joint ventures making use of the Commission's partitioning and
disaggregation rules."
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In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Fourth Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 10145
(1999).
Pages
10155

1015960

10167

Excerpt
"The most dramatic change in the mobile telephone industry since the
release of the Third Report has been the widespread adoption of what
are often referred to as 'digital-one-rate' ("DOR") price plans....
While the details of various operators' plans differ, they generally
include some combination of the following: bundles of large quantities
of minutes for a fixed monthly rate that translated into.., a low perminute price; no long distance charges when used on the operator's
network; no roaming charges when used on the operator's network;
reduced roaming charges when off the operator's network; and, in
some cases, no extra roaming charges anywhere."
"In 1998, three of 1997's top 25 operators in subscribership
consolidated with other carriers. Furthermore, if deals announced since
the release of the Third Report are completed, five additional operators
that were in the top 25 at the end of 1998 will be consolidated into
other carriers. One of the driving forces behind many of these
consolidations has been the desire of large regional carriers to enhance
their ability to compete effectively with national operators like AT&T,
Sprint PCS, and Nextel. As was discussed in the Third Report,
operators with larger footprints can achieve economies of scale and
increased efficiencies compared to operators with smaller footprints.
The need for increased size was exacerbated in the past year by the
introduction and success of AT&T's DOR plan and, in particular, its
low-cost roaming feature. According to analysts, it can be significantly
more expensive for regional operators to provide customers with this
feature than for national operators. One obvious way for an operator to
reduce roaming costs is by acquiring licenses covering as much of the
country as possible."
"[A] number of carriers are reporting that DOR plans are beginning to
exert downward price pressure on their roaming rates. During 1998,
carriers have reported that even though DOR plans have encouraged
increased roaming, they have also led to reductions in the negotiated
roaming rate charged to customers. In order to remain competitive,
carriers expect that they will continue to proactively renegotiate their
reciprocal roaming rates between operators to reduce rates even
further."

Number 1]

CELLULAR PHONE REGULATION

In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Fifth Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 17660
(2000).
Pages
17669

Excerpt
"The Commission previously concluded that
footprints can achieve economies of scale and
compared to operators with smaller footprints.
companies to introduce and expand innovative

operators with larger
increased efficiencies
Such benefits permit
pricing plans such as

digital-one-rate type ("DOR") plans, reducing prices to consumers."

17669

"Analysts have drawn similar conclusions, predicting that the current
consolidation will intensify competition among nationwide wireless
providers."

17670

17678

17679

"Moreover, it is important to emphasize that, along with the process of
consolidation, the mobile telephone sector continues to experience
heightened competition as a result of the expansion by broadband PCS
carriers and Nextel."
"According to a report by a third analyst, subscribers with mediumusage level ... saw the greatest benefits of price competition during
1999. This is a change from this analyst's same study from the
previous year in which it concluded that price competition had
focused primarily on high-usage customers... during 1998."
"Competition from firms with large or nationwide footprints that are
able to minimize the need for roaming by their customers may be
forcing other firms to lower their roaming rates."

17682

17682

17686

"[The trend of increasing minutes-of-use] may also indicate that
mobile telephony is moving away from just complementing existing
wireline voice service and towards competing directly with it."
"The desire by operators to create nationwide footprints for their
chosen digital technology continued during 1999. The Fourth Report
discussed how this drive stems from cellular operators needing to
improve capacity as well as increase their advanced service offerings,
and from broadband PCS and digital SMR operators needing to
expand their footprints and increase their competitiveness."
"Of the 12 companies on the mobile telephone sector's list of the top
25 operators by subscribership (pro forma year-end 1999) that have
consolidated since the end of 1998, seven were cellular-only operators
and two others were predominantly cellular carriers with broadband
PCS operations. As a result, the three largest carriers on the pro forma
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year-end 1999 top 25 subscriber list controlled systems serving 82
percent of all cellular customers. The top three carriers previously had
controlled only 40 percent at the end of 1998."
"Among the major carriers, achieving a national presence and a
nationwide infrastructure are perceived as necessary to respond to
consumer demands for seamless service at reasonable prices."
"Between December 1998 and December 1999, five of the top 25
operators by subscribership combined with other carriers.
Furthermore, since the end of 1999, five operators in the year-end
1999 top 25 have merged with other carriers.... As was the case last
year, the two most prominent mergers involved large regional
operators attempting to create nationwide footprints in order to
compete effectively with existing nationwide operators."
"Some analysts predict that the current consolidation will intensify
competition among nationwide wireless providers. Their reasoning is
that the cost savings made possible by operating large scale wireless
networks will push these carriers to extend innovative pricing plans,
such as DOR-type plans, to broader segments of the market....
Indeed, there is some evidence that the addition of new nationwide
operators already may be contributing to decreasing prices. For
example, according to one survey, prices declined by approximately
eight percent during the last six months of 1999."
"[I]t is important to emphasize that, along with the process of
consolidation across geographic areas, the mobile telephone sector
continues to experience heightened competition within geographic
areas as a result of the expansion by broadband PCS carriers and
Nextel."
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In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Sixth Report, 16 F.C.C.R. 13350
(2001).
Page
13353-54

13362-63

Excerpt
"In the year 2000, the CMRS industry continued to experience
increased competition and innovation as evidenced by lower prices for
consumers and increased diversity of service offerings. The process of
carriers building nationwide footprints continues to be a significant
trend in the mobile telephone sector. The year 2000 saw a number of
operators fill in gaps in their coverage through mergers, acquisitions,
and license swaps. In parallel with the process of footprint building,
mobile telephone operators continue to deploy their networks in an
increasing number of markets, expand their digital footprints, and
develop innovative pricing plans."
"The Commission has concluded previously that operators with larger
footprints can achieve certain economies of scale and increased
efficiencies compared to operators with smaller footprints. Such
benefits.., have permitted companies to introduce and expand
innovative pricing plans such as digital-one-rate type ... plans,
reducing prices to consumers."

13363

"Since the end of 1999, carriers have continued to build nationwide
footprints using combinations, acquisitions, and license swaps. One of
the driving forces behind many of these transactions has been the
desire of large regional carriers to enhance their ability to compete
with existing nationwide operators that offer attractive nationwide
pricing plans. National operators have also sought to [fill in gaps] in
their coverage."

234
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In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Seventh Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 12985
(2002).
Pages
12988

12990

Excerpt
"In the year 2001, the CMRS industry continued to experience
increased competition, innovation, lower prices for consumers, and
increased diversity of service offerings. The year saw a number of
operators continue to fill in gaps in their national coverage through
mergers, acquisitions, license swaps, and joint ventures. In parallel
with this process of footprint building, mobile telephone operators
continue to deploy their networks in an increasing number of markets,
expand their digital networks, and develop innovative pricing plans."
"Finally, in part because of competitive pressures in the marketplace,
the average price of mobile telephone service has declined during the
year since the Sixth Report, continuing the trend of the last several
years. According to the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the price of residential mobile telephone service declined by
5.5 percent during 2001. Another survey indicates that the average
revenue per minute of mobile telephone use fell 31 percent between
2000 and 2001."

12997-98

13003

"The Commission has concluded previously that operators with larger
footprints can achieve certain economies of scale and increased
efficiencies compared to operators with smaller footprints. Such
benefits, along with advances such as digital technology, have
permitted companies to introduce and expand innovative pricing plans
such as digital-one-rate... type plans, reducing prices to consumers.
Since the end of 1999, carriers have been building nationwide
footprints through various forms of transactions. One of the driving
forces behind many of these transactions has been the desire of large
regional carriers to enhance their ability to compete with existing
nationwide operators that offer attractive nationwide pricing plans.
More recently, national operators have sought to fill in the gaps in
their coverage areas."
"In addition, continued downward price trends and continued
expansion of mobile networks into new and existing markets are
related in different ways to the level of competition for mobile
telephony customers. These metrics generally demonstrate a high level
of competition for most consumers."
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"Roaming revenues as a percentage of total service revenue have been
declining for years, from 11 percent reported in [a] December 1997
survey to 5.6 percent in the June 2001 survey. CTIA attributes this
decline to the growth of DOR plans and the extended calling areas
established by many of the larger carriers."
"Econ One conducted an analysis in October 2001 of mobile
telephony pricing in rural versus urban markets. Econ One reviewed
the pricing plans of 25 markets it considered to be rural. The average
population of the rural markets was 95,000, compared to the average
population of 4.4 million in the top 25 U.S. cities. Econ One found
there was virtually no difference in the average monthly charge for
wireless service between the two groups."
"In most respects, small market carriers like Dobson are subject to the
same competitive pressures as the large market carriers. Because of
national advertising and the Internet, consumers all over the country
are educated about nationwide rate plans and services enabled by
digital technology and the prices of wireless handsets. No matter
where they live, customers expect and demand the diversity of
services at competitive rates. ...
Econ One's pricing study found evidence of this nationwide pricing
effect, in that its study showed no differences in service costs between
rural and urban markets."
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Appendix 2.
Comments from Investment Analysts on the Efficiency
of National Wireless Networks
In 1999, the publicly traded wireless telephone carriers included two
national players, Sprint PCS and Nextel, and four major regional PCS
carriers-Aerial Communications, Omnipoint, Powertel, and Western
Wireless. Analysts noted a disequilibrium: "Bottom line, the regional
carriers trade at a significant discount."' 9 7 Reading the market evidence
drove Merrill Lynch to a conclusion regarding economies of geographic
scope:
There's little question in our mind that wireless in the US is becoming
a national game. With one-rate plans offering no roaming and no long
distance charges, national reach appears to be important.
We understand the argument that most people only use their phone
locally-but we also think that people would like to think that they
might use their phone nationally. Think about it.
Moreover, national pricing is simple to understand. There is one rate.
Period. No more roaming charges. No more long distance charges. The
unknown is taken out of the 1 98
equation. We think that this helps to
simplify the purchase decision.
In the intervening years, this observation has played out, as the
leading regional wireless phone companies have been consolidated into the
national systems. VoiceStream (which was spun off from Western
Wireless) purchased Omnipoint in February 2000 and Aerial in May 2000;
VoiceStream and Powertel were then both purchased by Deutsche
Telekom, creating T-Mobile, in May 2001. Essentially, all four of the
leading regional carriers listed by Merrill Lynch in March 1999 became
integrated components of national networks over the next two years.1 99
As late as 2001, analysts comparing U.S. wireless penetration to
levels achieved in many European countries were struck by the handicap
imposed by small U.S. license areas. In distributing cellular franchises
across 734 markets, and PCS across 51 MTAs or 493 BTAs, U.S.
197. LINDA J. MUTSCHLER & PAUL WUH, MERRILL LYNCH, THE NEXT GENERATION III:
WIRELESS IN THE US 17 (1999).
198. Id. at 19.
199. While Western Wireless is still an independent carrier serving 1.2 million
subscribers, the portion spun off in the form of VoiceStream is substantially larger. Western
Wireless Corporation Web site, at http://www.wwireless.com/Default.asp?xdir=-AB (last
visited Oct. 5, 2003).
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regulators undermined national economies of scope. This imposed a
substantial tax on subscribers. Legg Mason theorized that "local licenses"
were the number one problem faced by American wireless carriers vis-A-vis
their counterparts elsewhere:
Local Licenses. While most developed countries around the world
allocated wireless licenses on a nationwide basis, the U.S. had done so
market by market. Accordingly, very few wireless carriers have truly
nationwide footprints and the ones that do have yet to build them out
completely. As a result, subscribers often are forced to roam on the
wireless networks of other carriers when they are outside of their home
calling area. Not only does roaming often result in the loss of enhanced
digital services, but it has historically cost about $.50 per minute or
more, inhibiting wireless usage. 2°
The same report found, conversely, that subscribers had benefitted as
consolidation took place:
... although wireless licenses continue to be allocated on a market-bymarket basis (and potentially on a regional basis, with the upcoming
700 MHz auction), the number of nationwide carriers has increased
materially from just three a year ago (Sprint PCS, AT&T Wireless,
Nextel) to potentially six today (including Verizon Wireless, Cingular
Wireless, and VoiceStream). Most of these wireless operators have
launched some type of "One Rate" plan over the last two years,
essentially making high roaming and long distance charges a thing of
the past.2° '

200. What's Next for Wireless, supra note 43, at 14.
201. Id. at 20.
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